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ABSTRACT
Police departments in American cities were significantly
affected by a number of reform movements during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like other urban reform
movements of the period, these emerged in response to changing
social conditions within the nation's cities. The goal of the
police reformers was to eliminate the variety of social and
political services that the police had traditionally provided and
to create a new force whose exclusive function would be to provide
efficient and impartial enforcement of the law. Reformers
eventually came to believe that adequate levels of efficiency and
impartiality could only be maintained if police departments
adopted organizational structures that concentrated
decision-making power in the hands of a single chief executive and
that enabled the department to function with a minimum of outside
interference. Furthermore, the new role required that all members
of the department commit themselves to a new ethic of professional
behavior.
Groups whose interests were more likely to be advanced by a
continuation of the policemen's traditional role opposed the
implementation of the reformers' ideas. In many cities, this led
to a period of struggle for control of the police department. In
most cases, reformers, with the assistance of other interest
groups, were able to gain the upper hand in these struggles, and
so, by World War I, many urban police departments had been
reorganized along the lines promoted by the reformers. Throughout
this period of struggle and reform, however, neither the reformers
nor their opponents showed much concern about the interests of the
rank-and-file patrolmen. In fact, many of the reforms that were
implemented during this period proved to be detrimental to the
policemen's interests.
This paper discusses the impact that police reform had on the
Boston Police Department and the role that these reforms played in
generating the conflicts that culminated in the Boston Police
Strike of 1919. During the early twentieth century, Boston adopted
many of the ideas of the reformers. At the same time that police
reformers were promoting Boston's police department as a model to
be emulated by other American police forces, however, growing
dissatisfaction among the city's patrolmen, much of it caused by
conditions that resulted directly or indirectly from the
implementation of these reforms, was creating a crisis within the
department. Furthermore, the administrative structures that had
been adopted in response to the reform movement created obstacles
that limited the city officials' ability to resolve the conflicts
within the department and to avert the impending crisis. In the
end, this crisis resulted in a temporary break-down of the
mechanisms upon which the city depended for the maintenance of law
and order.
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POLICE REFORM AND THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE OF 1919

INTRODUCTION

During the half century between 1870 and 1920, American
society underwent a transformation that resulted in the
establishment of an entirely new social order. Just as the rapid
growth of American industry forever altered the nation's economic
landscape, the accompanying emergence of large urban centers gave
rise to social patterns that diverged dramatically from those that
had existed previously. The shift to large-scale industrial
production and the Increased wealth that this production
generated, together with the development of corporations with
their hierarchical ackninistratlve structures, created new social
classes. Urban life imposed fundamental changes on the ways social
groups interacted with one another. The concentration of growing
numbers of people in the nation's cities and the arrival of
ever-increasing numbers of immigrants injected new values, new
outlooks and new ambitions into American culture. A transformation
of such magnitude naturally put a tremendous strain on the
society. Conflict erupted not only between the old and the new,
but also among the various components that made up the new social
order. As a result, this period was not simply one of profound
change; it was also a time of nearly constant adjustment and
readjustment to the new conditions that these changes produced.
All of the social groups with interests in the new urban
society expected the city police to play a role in this process of
adjustment. Since each group pursued a different set of goals,
however, each held a different view of Just what the police
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force's proper role was to be. Machine politicians were quick to
recognize that the large number of Jobs available within the
police department, along with the policeman's power to determine
when and against whom to enforce the law, constituted valuable
commodities that could be traded whenever it was necessary to
gather votes or financial contributions. Conversely, rural
conservatives saw the police as the last bulwark against a
complete take-over of municipal affairs by these same "undesirable
elements", whose influence grew in proportion to the size of the
working-class populations from which they drew their support. To
the working class Itself, the police department offered stable
jobs and, hence, opportunities for financial security and social
mobility. To the industrialist, however, the power exercised by
the police force gave it great potential as a means of controlling
the working class and defending private property, especially
during labor disputes. The middle-class moralists viewed the
police force as the most potent weapon in their continuous war on
vice, while to yet another group of reformers, the civic reformers
of the day, the police constituted an essential component in the
new municipal administrative structure that they hoped to create,
a structure that they were confident would bring order, efficiency
and an impartial distribution of the benefits of society to urban
America. While these groups held conflicting views of the
policeman's appropriate role In the new urban society and,
consequently, made widely divergent demands on the police force,
one thing was understood by all: the group that controlled the

3

police department would get to define the departments role. As a
result* police history during this period Is largely the story of
the competition for control that was waged by the various Interest
groups within the urban society.
No single group ever managed to gain complete control over
the police during this period. However* by 1910 civic reformers
had replaced machine politicians as the group that exercised the
greatest influence over the development of many city police
departments. Through a series of reforms designed to make police
departments more efficient* to free them from the influence of
other groups and to professionalize both police work and the
policeman* these reformers significantly altered both the
administrative structure of the police force and the function that
the police served within the community. They likewise altered the
patrolman's own perception of his work. These reformers, however,
like the others who vied for control of the police department*
rarely devoted any attention to the needs and desires of the
policeman himself. Each of these groups, in fact, viewed the
policeman as little more than a functionary who was expected to
compliantly assist in the accomplishment of the group's own
particular alms. As a result, the police reforms of the period
frequently created situations that threatened the interests of the
policeman.
Boston was one of the many American cities whose police were
significantly affected by succeeding waves of police reform.
Between 1875 and the beginning of World War I, the Boston Police
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Department was subjected to numerous changes, each of which was
touted by Its promoters as an essential prerequisite for Improving
the department's performance. By 1915, reformers rated Boston's
police force one of the most effective and least corrupt In the
nation.1 However, the very conditions that won such praise for the
Boston Police Department also contributed to the increasing
dissatisfaction of the city's policemen. In fact, not only did
these reforms add to the patrolmen's

growing list of complaints,

but they also created conditions that severely limited the
policemen's ability to secure acceptable redress of their
grievances. At the same time, these reforms sparked a growing
occupational awareness that intensified the patrolmen's
determination to find solutions to these problems.
By 1919, this frustration was compounded by concern over
postwar inflation and the resulting deterioration of the
patrolmen's economic position. Determined to find a way to improve
their situation, the policemen of Boston sought assistance from a
source that had supported numerous other members of the working
class in their quest for a better life: they decided to form a
union and to seek affiliation with the American Federation of
Labor. Uncompromising opposition from local authorities failed to
deter the policemen from proceeding with these plans. During the
crisis that ensued, the administrative patterns established by the
earlier reforms again came into play in a way that significantly
hampered city officials' attempts to diffuse the situation. These
events culminated in a strike by the policemen in September 1919.
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In the wake of this strike, the once acclaimed Boston Police
Department was left In ruins, and the organization of a new force
was begun.
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CHAPTER I

POLICE REFORM IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
STATE CONTROL

The only way for a particular group to ensure that the police
performed those functions that the group deemed appropriate was
for that group to see to it that those who ran the police
department were sympathetic to the group's goals. Hence, police
reform during the late 1800's and early 1900's focused more
attention on the administrative structure of the force than on any
other single issue. In Boston, as in many other cities, this
resulted in repeated reorganization of the command structure and
in frequent attempts to redefine the police department's
relationship with local and state authorities. As each succeeding
group came to the fore, it altered the acbnlnistrative structure of
the department in ways that were designed to facilitate the
promotion of that group's own alms and, at the same time, to
minimize the amount of influence that competing groups could
exercise over the police. The first wave of reform occurred
between 1875 and 1890, when the state government assumed control
over the Boston Police Department. The second period of reform
began after 1900. By 1910, however, the restructuring came to an
end, and the administrative patterns that were to continue until
the 1960's were firmly in place.
By the mid-1800's, police departments had come to play a
central role in the operation of local political machines in most
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large American cities. Distribution of the large number of Jobs
available within the police department provided the party boss
with one of his most Important sources of patronage. Since
patrolmen were often appointed on a yearly basis, and since
continuance in their Jobs depended upon their loyalty to those who
had appointed them, the existence of a large police force
automatically generated significant numbers of votes and financial
contributions for the party in power. Furthermore, the policeman's
position within the community, especially within the working-class
districts, helped to win support for the party machine. By
providing services that ranged from the provision of free food and
lodging for the indigent to the return of lost children, the
policeman was a symbol of the party boss's benevolence and concern
for the welfare of his constituents. At election time, the police
force could be put to work canvassing the neighborhoods for votes.
However, it was the tremendous discretionary power exercised by
the policeman on his beat, his ability to decide when to enforce
the law and when to look the other way, that made him a more
valuable ally than any other municipal worker in the machine
politician's quest for electoral support and in his bid to reduce
the power of his rivals.1
Until the 1870's, the Boston Police Department was
administered by a chief of police who was appointed Jointly by the
mayor and the board of aldermen and was then supervised by a
committee that consisted of several of the aldermen. Such direct
control by city officials, typical of mid-nineteenth century
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police departments, enabled party bosses to regulate the
activities of the police through their control of the city
government. However, In Boston and in many other cities, this
pattern of police actainlstration eventually came under attack from
a number of different sources. Opponents of the party machines
sought to break the bosses/ hold on the police departments, and
civic reformers throughout the United States, pointing out that
city council members were often saloon keepers or others whom the
police were expected to control, argued for a system that would
encourage more impartial enforcement of the law. In Boston, social
reformers were very critical of the social welfare functions that
the police performed, insisting that the police were encouraging
pauperism and Interfering with the reformers' efforts to identify
and help the "deserving poor" by indiscriminately providing soup
and lodging for vagrants. As a result, proponents of change in
Boston and in many other cities launched movements to place the
police under the control of special police boards whose membership
would not overlap with that of the city council. Advocates of such
plans argued that the creation of a police board to replace a
single chief of police would also prevent the concentration of
power in the hands of one acininistrator and would thus reduce the
likelihood of corruption, favoritism or control by machine
politicians. The city of Philadelphia established such a system in
1850. Many other large American cities soon followed suit,
including New York (1853), New Orleans (1853), Cincinnati (1859),
San Francisco (1859), Saint Louis (1861), Kansas City (1861),
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Detroit (1861), Buffalo (1866), Cleveland (1866) and Atlanta
(1874). Boston was one of the last cities to adopt this type of
acinin1strative structure. In 1878, the legislature of
Massachusetts created a three-member board of police commissioners
to run the Boston Police Department. The commissioners were to be
appointed by the mayor of the city with the consent of the board
of aldermen. In addition to administering the police department,
this board was also given the power to distribute liquor licenses,
a power that had previously been exercised by the board of
aldermen.2
This move, however, did not satisfy the critics in most
cities for long. Party bosses, through their ability to control
the municipal officials who appointed the police boards, continued
to determine the role that the police played within the city, so
the conditions that had existed before the establishment of the
boards persisted. Charitable organizations continued to complain
that police activities undermined their work and opponents of the
local party machines continued to resent the power that control
over the police department gave to the party boss. In Boston,
reform groups like the New England Society for the Suppression of
Vice and the Citizens' Law and Order League of Massachusetts
attacked the police department's laxity in enforcing liquor laws
and in fighting prostitution and gambling, blaming this laxity on
the influence of city politicians. In its 1884 report, the New
England Society called for "a radical and thorough reform of our
police system."3 Opponents of the Democratic machine that
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dominated Boston politics by this time were likewise dissatisfied
with the results of the restructuring. One Republican insisted,
"It is CasJ certain that the force will be used for partisan
purposes as It is that the mayor is a politician. Who ever knew of
a Democratic politician to lose such an opportunity?*4
Many of these critics began to believe that the only way to
remedy this situation was to remove the police force from the
control of municipal officials altogether. Reform groups like the
New England Society and the Law and Order League began to agitate
for a transfer of control from the city government to the state
level. These groups argued that state control would remove the
influence of partisan politics from the operation of the police
force and hence improve the quality of law enforcement. In 1881,
Annie Adams Fields, founder of the Associated Charities in Boston,
wrote to the governor of Massachusetts to request that the state
assume responsibility for appointing the city/s board of police
commissioners, Insisting that, *our work for the poor in Boston is
almost neutralized by the absence of help from the very source
where we should look for it.*5
During the early 1880's, the movement to establish state
control over the Boston Police Department gathered momentum.
Republican leaders had by this time realized the hopelessness of
their dreams of wresting control of the city government from a
Democratic Party machine which drew its support from the
ever-growing immigrant population of the city. Transferring
control of the police department to the state government, which
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was dominated by representatives from the heavlly-Republlean rural
areas of the state, offered them a way of maintaining at least
some Influence over municipal affairs. Residents of rural areas
themselves were becoming increasingly concerned as the number of
immigrants who arrived in the city each year increased. By 1880,
nearly one third of the population of Boston was foreign-born. The
incorporation of such large numbers of immigrants into the city/s
population was having a profound (and, according to the defenders
of the old norms, a profoundly adverse) impact on the social,
political, economic and religious life of Boston. Suspicious in
particular of the Irish, who constituted more than 56% of the
foreign-born population and who were coming to dominate political
life within the city in general and the city's Democratic Party
hierarchy in particular, rural conservatives viewed state control
as a way to ensure that the police power remained in "safe" hands.
Thus, the movement for state control of the Boston Police
Department linked two groups with divergent aims: the civic and
social reformers who hoped that state control would lead to more
impartial and effective law enforcement and the conservative
Republicans who saw it as a way of wresting power from the
Democratic Party bosses.6
In the wake of the election of Boston's first Irish Catholic
mayor, Hugh O'Brien, in 1885, the state legislature complied with
the requests of these critics. Shortly after O'Brien appointed a
second Irish Democrat to the three-man board of police
commissioners, Republicans in the Massachusetts General Court
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introduced a bill to transfer the power to appoint the board of
police commissloners to the state government. The new police board
was to be a bipartisan body of three commissioners appointed to
five-year terms by the governor. Since Republicans had occupied
the governor's office for 25 of the previous 27 years, this
effectively removed control of Boston's police force from the
hands of the city's Democratic Party bosses. In case a Democrat
were to somehow be elected governor, however, these appointments
were made subject to the consent of the state's Executive Council,
whose seats were apportioned in such a way as to ensure control by
Republicans from outside of the city. In spite of opposition from
Democrats, the legislature's Republican majority was able to
secure passage of the bill before the end of 1885. A second bill
adopted at the same time gave the state control over the city's
finances by setting a limit on the city's tax rate and requiring
the consent of the General Court before the tax rate could be
changed.7 Boston Democrats protested that these measures violated
the principle of "home rule". The Boston Globe complained,

To say that Boston has not the intelligence and
the will to regulate her own immediate concerns is
an insult to her citizens. The metropolis of the
Commonwealth is robbed of one of the most
Important functions of self-government In order to
gratify the malice of some, the fanatical notions
of others, and the political Interests of many
more.8

But the Republican majority in the General Court countered such
arguments with the assertion that the board of police
commissioners had failed to adequately enforce the liquor laws and
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that, since a local police force held the primary responsibility
for enforcing laws passed by the state legislature, the General
Court had a vested Interest in seeing to it that the police
department carried out its duties properly. A year earlier, the
General Court had passed a civil service law designed to eliminate
political

Influence from decisions concerning the appointment of

policemen or their tenure in office. Armed with these measures,
reformers and Republicans were now convinced that they had finally
broken the Democratic Party bosses7 hold over the Boston Police
Department. Republicans were so pleased with the concept of state
control, in fact, that over the course of the next decade they saw
to it that the state assumed similar control over Boston's sewage,
park and water departments.9
In states throughout the nation, rural suspicion of rapidly
growing urban areas and the tendency for one party to control the
city while the other controlled the hinterland led to conflicts
similar to that which occurred in Boston. In case after case,
legislatures dominated by representatives from rural areas removed
city police forces and, later, other city services from the
jurisdiction of municipal officials. Thus, when the Massachusetts
legislature established state control over the Boston Police
Department in 1885, it was adopting a policy that had already been
tried in numerous other places. New York had assumed the lead
when, in 1857, the state government assumed control over the New
York Police Department. Over the course of the next thirty years,
the police departments in Baltimore (1860), Saint Louis (1861),
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Kansas City (1861), Chicago (1861), Detroit (1865), Cleveland
(1866), New Orleans (1868), Cincinnati (1877), San Francisco
(1877), Indianapolis (1883), and Omaha (1887) were all reorganized
along similar lines. Urban politicians in many cities, however,
protested persistently against the state governments/ assumption
of authority over city departments.10 In 1905, twenty years after
the establishment of state control of the Boston Police
Department, Mayor Patrick Andrew Collins called it a "violation of
the first principle of home rule, and a needless and profitless
wound to the pride of the first city in the Commonwealth.-11
State control of most city police departments was relatively
short-lived. Contrary to the hopes of reformers, state control did
not significantly Improve the quality of police service, nor did
it eliminate partisan politics from police affairs; it simply
replaced the Influence of one group of politicians with Influence
by another. In most cities, the alliance between those reformers
who sought more effective enforcement of the law and the partisan
groups, who supported state control of police departments simply
because it offered a means of reducing the power of the opposing
political party, quickly disintegrated. Thus, reformers did not
put up tremendous opposition when, in state after state, the party
that dominated city politics gained control of the state
government and restored city police departments to local control.
Local control was re-established in New York in 1870 and in most
other cities during the subsequent three decades. In
Massachusetts, however, the Republican Party maintained its
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control over the state government until the 1930's. Republicans
occupied the go v e r n o r s office for all but nine of the 46 years
between 1885 and 1931. Meanwhile the clty/s government remained
firmly In the hands of local Democratic leaders. This encouraged
the state government to retain Jurisdiction over the Boston Police
Department for a far longer period than was typical

in other

cities. By 1900, only four large cities still maintained
state-controlled police forces: Baltimore, Saint Louis, Kansas
City and Boston. In Boston, the power to appoint police
commissioners remained with the governor until 1962 .^
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CHAPTER II

POLICE REFORM IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURYs DEPARTMENTAL
INDEPENDENCE AND CENTRALIZATION

Urban reformers carried their campaigns for improved
municipal government Into the new century. In fact, these
campaigns took on an increased vigor after 1900. The reformers of
the early twentieth century did not promote a single unified
reform package, however. Instead, various directions and
divergent, and often conflicting, goals can be identified within
the urban reform movements of the period. Like many of their
predecessors In the previous century, some reformers continued to
focus on the eradication of vice and immorality, especially in the
working-class districts of the city. Others argued that Improved
education and universal schooling would eliminate much of the
squalor in the nation's urban areas. Yet other groups insisted
that the solutions to the city's problems lay in increased popular
control over local government. This last group of reformers
advocated a democratization of government through such means as
the secret ballot, home rule, direct primaries, initiative and
referendum. Conversely, other reformers blamed urban problems on
the irresponsibility of the city's voters and sought ways to
further remove the departments that provided municipal services
from the arena of electoral politics.
This latter group believed that the success of any plan to
improve the performance of the city government relied ultimately
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on administrative efficiency. This, they insisted, required
decision-making by experts who would occupy public positions not
because they were liked by the voters or loyal to the ruling
political boss, but because they possessed specialized knowledge
and skills that enabled them to run their respective departments
effectively. The city government, they insisted, should be modeled
after the actalnlstrative structures that allowed private
businesses to be run profitably. According to these reformers, the
proper functioning of such a system required that significant
degrees of autonomy be granted to the heads of municipal
departments. Not surprisingly, the leading promoters of this
strain of reform tended to be prominent businessmen, professionals
or members of the elite classes who had watched machine
politicians use electoral politics to edge them out of their
positions of control

in the city.1

It was this last strain of reform that had the greatest
impact on the development of city police departments during the
first twenty years of the twentieth century. Police departments
provided a vital service to the city, and yet they invariably had
a past that was colored by corruption and subservience to the
interests of party bosses. Thus, they were natural targets for the
work of these reformers. Like the civic reformers who worked to
improve other components of municipal government, those who
focused on the police tended to have ties with the elite,
professional or business classes. Chief among these were Leonhard
Fuld, a professor of actalnlstrative law at Columbia University,
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and Raymond B. Fosdlck, whose comprehensive study, American Police
Systems, was published by the Bureau of Social Hygiene, an
organization that was funded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Scholars
writing in the 1970's and 1980's have asserted that these reform
Impulses had their origins In the competition between classes
within the urban community. Samuel Walker argues that the
reformers sought to break the power that the working class held
over the police. Thomas Reppetto asserts, "until well into the
twentieth century,

it can be argued that the call for

ackninlstratlve reform was simply an attempt by an upper-class
minority to secure control over police acknlnistration regardless
of the will of the electorate." Sidney Harring claims that the
reformers' goal was to re-establish upper-class control over the
police so they would remain "an effective anti-working-class
force," while Eric Monkkonen Insists that one of the goals of
police reform was to eliminate the working-class attitudes and
values of the rank-and-file patrolman.2
In contrast to the reformers of the late 1800's, the early
twentieth-century police reformers did not feel that shifting
control of the city police department from one level of government
to another was, by itself, enough to significantly improve the
performance of urban police forces. Instead, they focused far more
attention on the conditions that existed within the police
department itself. The aim of the police reformer of this period
was to create a highly disciplined crime-fighting organization
that would be independent of outside control and, hence, would
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enforce laws with consistency and Impartiality. The behavior of
the members of such a department would not be controlled by the
promise of patronage and of petty graft, but by obedience within a
hierarchical command structure and by a strict adherence to a code
of professional standards. The scope of the police department's
duties, these reformers believed, also had to be narrowed to
include nothing more than the prevention of crime and the strict
enforcement of the law if the department were to perform these two
functions with an acceptable degree of efficiency.3
Reformers like Fuld and Fosdlck identified three
characteristics which they believed were essential to the proper
operation of a city police department: independence from outside
interference, centralized decision-making and professionalism. In
most cases they found American police forces to be sorely lacking
in each of these areas. They repeatedly pointed to police
departments in Europe, especially to that of London, as examples
of highly efficient, we 11-organized agencies that were well beyond
the reach of local or even national politicians. However, by 1915,
American police reformers were beginning to see some of the same
characteristics in the Boston Police Department. As a result, the
Boston police earned a fair amount of praise from police
reformers. According to Fosdlck, the Boston Police Department
"stood well

in the lead of police organizations throughout the

country." Another observer, George H. McCaffrey, claimed that
"Boston had a very excellent police force, perhaps the best in
America."4
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Departmental Independence
To the police reformers of the early twentieth century, the
effective performance of police duties was only possible in a
department that was independent of all outside influence, and the
greatest threat to this independence, in their minds, came from
local politicians. As Fuld explained it, "When the politician's
influence begins to be felt In a police department the efficiency
of the department is bound to suffer." To Fuld there was an
inherent conflict between the politicians interest in securing
popularity by promoting a maximum of personal freedom and the
police departments proper function, which was, in Fuld's opinion,
to limit individual freedom by enforcing the law. According to
Fuld, in a police department over which local politicians hold
sway, the most efficient policemen will be punished while the most
lax will be rewarded. Fosdlck insisted that a force that is not
completely Independent of political control

is a "force

acininlstered with an eye to the next election,...its work dictated
by the political necessities of the moment."5
In their opposition to the political machine's dominance of
police departments, these reformers had something in common with
their predecessors of the nineteenth century. Fuld echoed the
sentiments of many earlier reformers when he wrote, "American
cities have shown an utter incapacity for self-government in the
department of police acininistration." However, the
twentieth-century police reformers had seen enough of state
control to know that it did not guarantee the police department's
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Independence from partisan politics. Fosdlck found state
Interference In police affairs as unforgivable as local
interference. He lamented the fact that, even while under state
control, city police departments had been made "pawns In the clash
of party interests." According to Fosdlck, "The effect of this
treatment on police organization has been peculiarly disastrous."6
In Boston/s case, however, Fosdlck found a rare example of
state control which he felt had been very successful.

He praised

the fact that, in Boston, "the actainistration of the police force
was conducted with a disregard for political considerations rarely
encountered in American cities" and insisted that the departments
progress would not have been possible had the department remained
under local control. "Whether due to a large foreign population,
or some condition of civic inertia, or factors peculiarly local,"
he wrote, "the government elected by the city of Boston has
generally been below the level of government elected by the state
of Massachusetts."7 George McCaffrey insisted that, before 1885:

the interests of the whole commonwealth were being
injured by the mismanagement of police affairs in
Boston. Political Influence then ran the
department in all its branches; officers were
appointed, removed and transferred without any
reference to their own personal qualifications.
Vice flourished in many forms all over the city.

However, due to the assumption of control by the state, McCaffrey
noted, "political

/pull/ is of absolutely no account in the police

organization of to-day; there is not a single gambling house of
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any account in Boston and the laws relating to the sale of liquor
can no longer be violated with impunity.-8
Reformers attributed much of this success to the policies
adopted by Stephen O'Meara, who served as Boston's police
commissioner from 1906, when the three-man police board was
replaced by a single commissioner, until his death twelve years
later. O'Meara was an anomaly in the Boston political arena: he
was an Irish Republican. He had been born in Prince Edward Island,
Canada, and had moved to Boston with his family in 1864, when he
was ten years old. O'Meara grew up in predominantly-Irish
Charlestown, and then went to work as a reporter for the Boston
£Lob£* From there he moved to the Boston Journal. where he
eventually advanced from reporter to editor to general manager and
finally to part-owner. In 1904, O'Meara launched a campaign to win
a Republican nomination for Congress, but was unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, his Republican politics and his financial success
brought O'Meara a degree of contact with Boston's social elite
that was unheard of for an Irish Catholic of his day. He was a
member of the Exchange, Algonquin, St. Botolph's and Union clubs
and was a personal friend of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.9
O'Meara represented the new breed of police administrator that
emerged during the early twentieth century. Most of his experience
had been in private business, not in public administration. In
fact, before he assumed command of the Boston Police Department,
O'Meara had had no experience with police work whatsoever. Like
August Vollmer of Berkeley, California, Richard Sylvester of
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Washington, D.C. and numerous other police executives, O'Meara
shared the reformers' belief in departmental

independence,

centralized control and professionalism. In fact, it was the
appointment of O'Meara and actalnistrators like him that allowed
the ideas of the reformers to be put into practice in city police
departments.10
One of O'Meara's foremost priorities as commissioner was to
eliminate all traces of political

Influence from the Boston Police

Department. After just a year in office, O'Meara reported:

The first efforts of the Police Commissioner were
directed to the task of convincing the members of
the admirable police force over which he took
control that they were to be absolutely free from
outside interference....They...were to look only
to their department superiors for rewards and
punishments.

Five years later, O'Meara proudly announced in his annual report
to the city government that "The Boston Police Department is
wholly free from politics —

the root of all evil in the policing

of American cities and towns." He went on to proclaim that, during
his tenure as police convnlssloner, not a single appointment,
promotion, transfer, expenditure or licensing decision "had been
influenced by any political personage or political
consideration.*12
O'Meara's ever-vigllant defense against outside interference
at times drew him into conflict with other city officials. In
1910, Mayor John F. Fitzgerald attempted to bypass both the civil
service commission and the police department's regular procedures
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for hiring and detailing patrolmen by personally assigning four
special policemen to the department for the purpose of patrolling
Boston Common and Franklin Square. In a series of letters to the
mayor, O'Meara protested this action, which he believed "would be
the beginning of an untested, unorganized, uninstructed,
undisciplined police force, control led...by the city authorities."
He underscored the fact that "the Boston police are assigned to
all parts of the city in accordance with the judgment and
experience of the heads of the department," and made it clear that
no one would be allowed to interfere with this prerogative.
Fitzgerald angrily replied:

I trust that mere loyalty to your own department
and an excessive regard for the technicalities of
the case will not override your sense of the
larger interests which are involved. It seems to
me your duty either to ratify these appointments
or to meet the situation by increasing the number
of officers on the Common and Franklin S q u a r e . * 3

Nevertheless, O'Meara refused to comply with the Mayor's request,
and the matter was dropped.
Even O'Meara's friend Henry Cabot Lodge could not persuade
the commissioner to overlook department rules. Lodge made a
personal petition to O'Meara requesting that the department hire a
candidate, Francis McDonald, who did not meet the physical
requirements for appointment as a patrolman. Lodge wrote to
O'Meara, "I take real interest in this case and should be much
indebted for anything you can do," to which O'Meara replied, "The
trouble with Mr. Francis McDonald...is that he walks very badly
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and for a policeman that Is a fatal defect....We are obliged to be
more particular."14
Unlike their predecessors in the nineteenth century, the
police reformers of the early twentieth century did not Invoke the
principle of departmental

Independence merely when trying to wrest

the police department from the control of the party boss. While
they recognized that machine politicians posed the most immediate
threat to the independence of the police department, these
reformers insisted that the operation of the department remain
free from any outside Influence, no matter what the source
(except, of course, influence from well-intentioned and insightful
reformers like themselves!). For example, they disagreed with
their predecessors on the inherent value of the civil service laws
that governed personnel matters. Fosdlck Insisted that, as a
result of civil service regulations, "there are in most large
departments many men whose continuance in office is a menace to
the force and to the community but who cannot be dismissed because
the proof of incompetence or dishonesty does not satisfy the
requirements of the civil service law." If a businessman were to
try to run his enterprise in such a manner, he insisted, "He would
be foredoomed to failure from the start." Fosdlck believed that
police administrators should have a freer hand in removing
undesirable officers. He also claimed that allowing tests
administered by a civil service board to determine which officers
should receive promotions "ranks symmetry above real efficiency."
Fuld insisted that the exams were not effective indicators of the
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officers7 potential for success for, as he put it, "the best
scholar is not necessarily the best policeman." Both men agreed
that a supervisor's assessment of the candidate's work provided
the best measure of a candidate's readiness for promotion.15
The process for distributing promotions within the Boston
Police Department was based, in part, on non-competitive exams,
but it also gave great discretionary power to police
administrators. According to this system, division captains
nominated patrolmen for promotion. Only those candidates who were
nominated and who received the approval of the police commissioner
were given civil service exams. The police commissioner would then
receive a list of those candidates who had passed the exam and
would award promotions to those men on the list whom he deemed to
be most worthy, regardless of their rank on the list. In 1913, the
state's civil service commission proposed the introduction of
competitive exams that would have been open to all who desired
promotions in order to make the police department conform to the
practices that were standard for other public agencies in the
state. O'Meara succeeded in blocking this change, which he called
"by far the greatest danger that has threatened this department
from any source in my seven years of service as commissioner."
Fosdlck praised the system of non-competitive examination used by
the Boston Police Department, likening it to the one used by the
London Police Department, and proclaimed it the best solution to
the problem of identifying officers for promotion.15

2?

Police reformers even argued that intervention by the courts
should be restricted, especially in cases that involved personnel
decisions. They stood staunchly opposed to granting policemen the
right to appeal their superiors' decisions in court. Fuld asserted
that, "The reinstatement of dismissed members of the force, which
amounts practically to a reversal of the careful and deliberate
decision of the chief administrative officer of the police force
by the courts, tends to lessen the respect in which the members of
the force should hold their c h i e f . F o s d l c k agreed, insisting
that "the unrestricted right of appeal to the courts from the
decision of a police administrator is a menace to the proper
exercise of discipline." Again, Fosdlck pointed out that such
conditions would not be tolerated in a business, and he praised
the Boston Police Department, whose men were forbidden to appeal
administrative decisions in the courts:

On no other basis can responsibility be
definitized and a police force be rid of useless
or dishonest employees. To divide responsibility
with a civil service commissioner, a mayor, a
court, or any other authority, is to sow the seed
of demoralization and to make real success
Impossible for any adnlnlstrator.1®

Thus, the Boston Police Department came closer to replicating
the early twentieth-century police reformers' model of a police
force that was independent of outside influences than did the
departments in most other major cities in the United States. To a
large degree, police officials were able to exercise this
Independence because of the retention of state control and its
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denial of influence to local politicians who had a significant
interest in using the department to promote their own personal
political goals. It was Police Commissioner O'Meara's unwavering
commitment to and stubborn defense of the principle of
departmental

independence, however, that significantly limited the

degree to which all outside groups, not simply local political
leaders, were able to Influence police department policies and
practices.

Centralized Desiaion-maKliig
To the early twentieth-century police reformer, the absence
of outside interference in police affairs did not by Itself
guarantee proper adninistration of the department. This
independence had to be accompanied by a complete centralization of
the decision-making power within the department. Like their
contemporaries who sought to alter the administrative structure of
municipal government as a whole, these reformers placed great
stock in the effectiveness of executive offices. Thus, they
devoted great attention to the role of the chief acknlnlstrator of
the department: the police commissioner in a large city or the
police chief in a small city or town. So long as he was chosen
solely on the basis of his ability as an administrator, police
reformers felt that the chief executive should be given virtually
unlimited power within the department and that he should be
allowed to continue in office as long as he performed his duties
effectively.^
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To the reformers, the issue of departmental autonomy was
Inextricably connected with the idea of centralized
decision-making. Reformers and police acknlnistrators alike viewed
outside intervention in such matters as the appointment or
assignment of officers, the issuing of promotions or the
punishment of members of the force to be an Intolerable
encroachment on the police executive's proper Jurisdiction. Such
encroachment, they felt, divided the responsibility for
decision-making and severely undermined the departments ability
to perform its duties effectively. At the same time,
centralization of authority within the department was seen as the
best defense against external pressures. Fuld insisted that the
centralization of power in the hands of a single commissioner
would distance the police department from local politics, while
McCaffrey credited centralized control within the Boston Police
Department with "absolutely eliminatCing] the Influence of
politics in

a p p o i n t m e n t s . "20

Aga jn> recent historians have

interpreted the reformers' faith in centralized authority as a
product of the competition for control of the police by various
classes and Interest groups. Robert Fogelson argues that the move
to Increase the power of police executives was designed to
“strengthen their position vis-a-vis the ward bosses" and to break
the bosses' hold over the rank-and-file policemen. Sidney Harring
claims that the establishment of a strong police executive who
would function beyond the reach of elected officials was an
upper-class adjustment to the growing political power of an
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organized working class. Samuel Walker agrees that centralization
was primarily an effort to Isolate the police department from the
working cl ass.21
To Fuld, Fosdlck and other reformers, dividing the
responsibility for a police department by placing It under the
Jurisdiction of a board of supervisors was a grave error. Unlike
the reformers of the previous century who viewed divided authority
as a safeguard against corruption and favoritism, Fosdlck found it
"an encumbrance rather than a help. The essential qualities in
police actainistration are those which a single-headed executive
can best bring to task." Upon reviewing the performance of police
boards In various cities, Fosdlck concluded that the lack of unity
and the indecisiveness which marked such boards prevented their
police departments from taking any "progressive steps." Fuld
contended that:

The single commissioner system...is well fitted
for the discharge of duties which require energy
and rapidity of action and for which it is
desirable to have a fixed and well-defined
responsibility. No department of the city
government requires more rapid, or more energetic,
or more responsible action than does the police."

Fuld pointed out that in Europe, police departments were generally
commanded by single acbninistrators, "as [they] logically should
be.'22
Reformers were encouraged by the fact that the days of the
city police board seemed to be numbered. During the first two
decades of the twentieth century, city after city dismantled the
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police boards that had been set up during the previous wave of
reform. New York led the way when It abolished Its police board in
1901 and transferred control to a single police commissioner. In
contrast to the belatedness with which It had instituted earlier
structural reforms, Boston was one of the first cities to
implement this form of control. In 1906, the Massachusetts
legislature abolished the three-man board of commissioners which
it had created twenty-one years before and replaced it with a
single commissioner. Like the earlier board, the commissioner was
to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the state's
Executive Council. In order to minimize possible political
pressure on the commissioner, he was to be appointed for a
five-year term by a governor who had to run for re-election
annually. A governor could not remove the police commissioner from
office without the consent of the Executive Council. In approving
this restructuring, Governor Curtis Guild reiterated the
reformers' position on centralized control, saying “inefficiency,
if not disaster, follows divided responsibility in the control of
any organized body of men, where discipline and esprit de corps
must be the mainspring of success."23 In addition to New York and
Boston, other cities including Cleveland (1908), Cincinnati
(1908), Birmingham (1911), Omaha (1912), Saint Paul (1914) and
Buffalo (1916) adopted single-headed police administrations. By
1920, only 14 of the 52 American cities with populations of over
100,000 still retained police boards. However, among these
fourteen were Baltimore, Kansas City and Saint Louis, the only
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large cities other than Boston whose police departments remained
under state supervision. Boston, thus, became the only large city
in the United States with a police force that was administered by
a single powerful commissioner whose selection was completely
beyond the control of city officials.24
Under chapter 291 of the Acts of 1906 of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, the legislation that created the single-headed
ackninistration, Boston/s police commissioner was granted extensive
powers over both policy and personnel matters. As the head of the
department hierarchy, he maintained control over the force through
the division captains, who were responsible to him alone. He was
free to issue general orders and to amend the department rules at
any time, and such decisions were not subject to review by any
other body or official. When positions on the force became vacant,
the civil service commission sent the police commissioner a list
of the top scorers from the most recent round of civil service
exams. The number of candidates on the list was always
approximately double the number of open positions. After he had
personally interviewed each applicant on the list, the police
commissioner chose the men whom he wished to hire. As was true
regarding the promotion of officers, the commissioner was free to
choose any candidate regardless of his rank on the list of exam
scores. When a disciplinary complaint was lodged against an
officer, a trial board consisting of three division captains was
appointed by the police commissioner to hear the case, determine
the guilt or innocence of the officer in question, and recommend a
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punishment. The police commissioner, however, was free to order a
new hearing to be held before either the original board of
inquiry, a new board of his choosing, or himself. He was also free
to accept, reject or modify the b o a r d s sentencing recommendation
as he saw fit. The commissioner's decisions in such cases were
final and could not be appealed to the courts. Furthermore, the
commissioner had the power to simply dismiss a complaint against
an officer without a trial if he felt that the complaint was too
trivial to warrant action. The commissioner even had control over
the salaries of the departments members, for they could not be
changed without his approval.^5

By 1910, then, the administrative structure of the Boston
Police Department showed a degree of conformity to the principles
of autonomy and centralization that was unrivaled by any other
department in the nation. State control had severely curtailed the
influence that local politicians were able to exercise over the
department leadership. The elimination of board control and its
replacement by a single commissioner had placed responsibility for
all adninlstratlve decisions in the hands of a single executive
officer who was not accountable to the city government, to the
local party hierarchy or to the voters of the city. In fact, due
to the provisions that protected his tenure in office, the police
commissioner was only loosely accountable to the state officials
to whom he owed his position. According to the reformers, such
conditions served to maximize the effectiveness of the
decision-making process within the department by allowing the sole

34

objective of the commissioner's policies to be the Improvement of
the force/s ability to fight crime. Not only did the Boston Police
Departments acknlnlstratlve structure conform to the model
proposed by the reformers, but the man who Initially occupied the
top position within this structure shared most of the reformers/
views and endeavored to put their principles into practice.
0 /Meara was a strong, intelligent and capable leader who had
committed himself to the constant improvement of his departments
performance. As a result of these conditions, reformers repeatedly
praised the administration of the Boston Police Department.
However, while they placed great emphasis on structural reforms,
the reformers did not fail to recognize that a flawless
acknlnlstratlve system did not necessarily guarantee optimal
efficiency In the performance of duties. Improving police
performance ultimately required altering the behavior and the
attitudes of the rank-and-file policeman. This was the aim of the
third principle promoted by the police reformers: professionalism.
Altering the outlook of the patrolman on his beat, however, proved
to be a far greater challenge than modifying the departments
command structure.
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CHAPTER III

PROFESSIONALIZATION AND THE POLICEMAN

While departmental

independence and the centralization of

authority altered the administrative structure of the police
force, professionalization, the third component of the reformers'
program, was designed to alter the attitudes and behavior of the
policeman himself, as well as his relationship to his department.
Realizing that the ultimate responsibility for carrying out
performance objectives rested with the patrolman on his beat,
reformers turned their attention to identifying modifications
which, they hoped, would bring the conduct of patrolmen more in
line with the aims of the police reform movement. This generated
as much conflict as (if not more than) any other aspect of early
twentieth-century police reform. In part, this conflict resulted
from internal contradictions within the professional
Professionalization,

ideal itself.

in the end, led to the pursuit of goals that

were inherently incompatible with one another. In addition,
though, professionalization brought the policeman into conflict
with the reform movement. The reformers, socially Isolated from
the patrolman, had little understanding of, and even less sympathy
for, his needs. As a result, the implementation of specific reform
proposals was often detrimental to the patrolman's interests and
frequently demanded that the patrolman distance himself from his
own social and cultural background. In fact, Eric Monkkonen
contends that one of the chief aims of the professionalization
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movement was to eliminate the working-class nature of the
patrolman's values and attitudes.1 In the end, professionalization
had two distinct effects: it generated an increased occupational
identity among the policemen and it contributed to the growing
frustration that they felt on the Job. These two attitudes were
destined to collide with one another.
The rank-and-file of the typical city police department of
the early twentieth century was recruited overwhelmingly from the
working class of the city it served. As Leonhard Fuld pointed out,
“Men who have enjoyed the benefit of a good general education are
deterred from entering the police service in America, both because
of the inadequate salaries as well as because of the generally
undesirable character of police work." While low prestige and
salaries comparable to those paid to skilled laborers deterred men
from the middle and upper classes from pursuing a career with the
police department, the relative security of the Jobs in the
department, which were less directly affected by fluctuations in
the economy than was true of most industrial Jobs, made police
work very attractive to members of the working class. Thus, Fuld
was able to report, patrolmen were "generally found among the
poorer people— drivers, motormen, porters, laborers, and the
like."2 This characterization was true of the Boston Police
Department. In his annual report for 1914, Police Commissioner
O'Meara divided the previous occupations of all of the members of
the Boston Police Force, more than fifteen hundred men, into the
following categories:
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Mechanical trades and other skilled handiwork
Transportation
Mercantile and manufacturing pursuits
Public and semi-public service
Unski 1led occupations
Miseellaneous

523 (33.0%)
516 (32.5%)
263 (16.6%)
116 (7.3%)
86 (5.4%)
82 (5.2%)
1586

O'Meara also identified the specific occupations that the men had
held before Joining the police department. Thirty-one men had been
in business for themselves; thirty had been managers, foremen or
superintendents; five had farmed; two had been athletic
instructors; one had been a photographer; one a ball player; and
one a student. All of the remaining men (95.5%) had held jobs that
could be classified as either skilled, clerical, service or
unskilled occupations. The specific occupations held by the
largest number of men were:

Street railway motormen
Teamsters
Clerks
Street railway conductors
Drivers, coachmen, chauffeurs, etc.
Machinists
Metalworkers
Firefighters
Locomotive and stationary engineers and firemen
Carpenters and woodworkers

161 men
140
118
91
54
50
50
50
47
42

Only 19 of the men (1.2%) had been policemen with another
department at the time of their appointment to the Boston Police
Force.3
The composition of the police force also reflected the impact
that immigration had had on Boston/s population. In a city in
which approximately 36% of the population was foreign-born, thirty
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per cent of the men on the police force In 1914 had been born
abroad. Over half of these had been born in Ireland. Furthermore,
by 1920 about half of all of Boston's policemen and 41% of its
residents were second-generation Americans. As the figures below
show, however, recently-arrived immigrant groups, such as the
Italians and the Russians, whose social status tended to fall
below that of the immigrant groups that had arrived earlier, were
significantly under-represented on the police force:

Place of Birth

Boston Police Force
<1914)

Boston Population
(1910)

Total

1,586

670,585

United States
Ireland
Canada & Newfoundland
Great Britain
Scandinavia
Germany
Italy
Russia
Other

1,108 (69.9%)
264 <16.7%)
155 <9.8%)
28 <1.8%)
14 <0.9%)
10 <0.6%)
3 <0.2%)
1 <0.1%)
3 <0.2%)

427,220 <63.7%)
66,041
<9.8%)
51,363 <7.7%)
19,048 <2.8%)
10,523 <1.6%)
8,701
<1.3%)
<4.7%)
31,380
41,892 <6.2%)
14,417 <2.1%)

Of those born within the United States, 694 (43.8% of the entire
force) had been born within the city of

Boston.4

The overwhelming majority of the Boston Police Force,
therefore, was recruited directly from the upper and middle ranks
of the city's own working class, with first- and second-generation
Irish-Americans comprising the largest share of the

force.®

As a

result, the members of the department had strong ties to the
community which they served and, in particular, to the city's
working-class neighborhoods. This was typical of most large cities
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In the United States. As Fuld observed, "the poor classes
fraternize with the policemen, since the policemen are of their
own social class", while the middle and upper classes tended to
remain aloof.^
To the reformer of the early twentieth century, the
predominantly working-class character of the rank-and-file
patrolman was most regrettable. Fuld complained, "The patrolmen
are almost Invariably men of limited education and Intelligence."
In fact, the reformers displayed nothing but contempt for the very
men whom they expected to play a central role in the new, more
efficient city police departments they were trying to create.
Raymond Fosdlck described the patrolman as "often...without
imagination or resourcefulness." Fuld was even sharper in his
condemnation. "The low opinion in which the American policemen are
held is due more to their intellectual

inferiority than to

anything else," he wrote. The Job attracts, "the man who desires a
position requiring only a minimum of work....[It] does not attract
into the ranks of the police men who would in private life attain
distinction by their efforts." Not only did the average new
recruit fail to meet with Fuld's approval, but, at least according
to Professor Fuld, the patrolman/s laziness actually increased
after he Joined the force. "The authority with which they are
invested," Fuld said, "and the respect shown them by the citizens,
create in them an Inordinate desire to shirk their work or, as
they themselves express it, 'to take it easy.'" These deficiencies
worried Fuld considerably. Pointing out that the policeman out on
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patrol somewhere In the city could not be directly supervised by
his superiors at all times, Fuld argued that the job required a
far greater degree of reliability and sound Judgment than he felt
the average patrolman possessed.7
The primary objective of professionalization, then, was to
"upgrade" the patrolman. The reformers7 plan was to transform what
they saw as a simple-minded, working-class Idler, devoid of the
slightest appreciation for the significance of his position, into
a dedicated, well-disciplined crime-fighting expert. They demanded
that stricter physical, mental and moral standards be employed
when hiring new recruits, and Fuld and others called on officials
to increase salaries and to improve working conditions in order to
induce the better-educated to choose policing as a career. In
addition to improving the pool of candidates from which policemen
were chosen, the reformers recommended measures to improve the
performance of those men already on the force. For instance, they
aggressively promoted the establishment and improvement of
training programs. At the same time, they demanded that the
patrolman's work be subjected to closer supervision and that he be
held more regularly accountable for the proper observation of
departmental procedures. Fuld called on the police supervisor to
constantly monitor his men and to avoid fraternization and "all
unofficerlike familiarity with his subordinates." Police reformers
also enthusiastically advocated the employment of the latest
crime-fighting methods and technology.8
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Aside from Improving the general

level of skill possessed by

the average patrolman, the reformers also sought to change the
policeman's own perception of his work. Associating a higfc rate of
turnover in personnel with the days of partisan interference, the
reformers set out to stabilize the police department by
introducing the idea that police work was not Just a Job to be
held until a better one came along. Patrolmen, according to Fuld,
had to be convinced to “make the police business their lifework.-9
In short, the reformers hoped to instill a middle-class concept of
career in a population that was overwhelmingly working-class in
background.
The police reformers showed little regard for whether or not
such fundamental changes met with the approval of the patrolmen
themselves. To the reformers, and to many police administrators,
the patrolman's opinion was of little value and was certainly not
to enter into any discussion regarding the improvement of police
performance. Samuel Walker writes, “the patrolman was regarded as
clay, to be molded by the police executive.11 According to Fuld,
“they are soldiers, whose first duty is to obey.-1** Such military
analogies were commonly invoked by police reformers and public
officials alike during the early part of the twentieth century.
Major Richard Sylvester, the head of the Washington, D.C. police
department, referred to his men as “citizen soldiers." In 1918,
the mayor of Cincinnati compared the role of the police of his
city with that of the American troops fighting in France, and, in
an effort to ensure the policemen's adherence to department
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policy, stated, "Policemen are soldiers and they should obey
orders as they have sworn to do." In fact, it was during this
period that it became common for the various ranks within the
police department to be given military labels: patrolmen became
privates, and superior officers became sergeants, lieutenants and
captains.*1
Reformers and public officials of this period also began to
voice the opinion that holding a public service position was a
privilege and that, due to his peculiar position within the
community, the policeman could not expect to be allowed to
exercise the same rights as other citizens. In 1897, in the case
of McAuliffe v. Mavor of New Bedford. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes of the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a policeman
could be dismissed from his position for engaging in political
activity when such activity was forbidden by a police department
regulation. Holmes argued, "The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman....The servant cannot
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered to him." These same principles were Invoked when the
"Goethals Bill" was introduced in the New York State Legislature
in 1914. This bill would have taken away the New York policemen's
right to appeal departmental disciplinary decisions in the courts.
By pressuring legislators, policemen were able to prevent the
passage of the bill. However, a similar measure had already
deprived the Boston police of the right of appeal
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in such cases.*2

Professionalization of the police force required alteration
of more than Just the policeman's behavior and perceptions,
however. The range of duties that policemen performed had to be
drastically narrowed, the reformers believed, if the police were
to efficiently perform the crime-fighting functions for which they
had been trained. Traditionally, city police forces had provided a
tremendous array of services: from providing food and shelter for
the indigent to compiling the annual census of school children,
from investigating Jurors to inspecting tenements. They supervised
elections, cleaned the streets, registered voters, caught stray
animals and issued licenses to saloon keepers, carriage operators,
dog breeders, peddlers and musicians. To reformers, these services
were unnecessary distractions. Fosdlck called them "Irrelevant
activities” and complained that, because of them, ”the primary
function of the police has often been left to drift along with
little guidance or oversight by administrators." "To this unwise
and unsound partnership between the police force and unrelated
functions of government," he argued, "much of the corruption and
demoralization in American municipalities can be traced." Not only
did the reformers demand the elimination of all of the
non-crime-related services that the department as a whole
provided, but they also called for strict limits on the types of
tasks that individual patrolmen were required to perform. Fuld
insisted that patrolmen should not be assigned to perform clerical
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work, to assist in other municipal departments, or to run errands
for superior officers. Such tasks, if they were necessary, were to
be assigned to clerks, for patrolmen "are too expensive for this
work. They are selected for police patrol service and it is wrong
to detail them for any [other] purpose.-13
In Boston, Police Commissioner O'Meara did his best to
promote the professional

ideal among his men. His goal, like that

of the police reformers, was to mold the department into a
dedicated, disciplined and efficient crime-fighting force. Shortly
after his death, the Boston Globe paid tribute to O'Meara by
pointing out that -Mr. O'Meara had impressed it on his men that
their's were not 'Jobs' but 'positions,' and that they had been
chosen for their work because of special fitness of which they had
a right to be proud and to which they must live up.-14 From the
outset, O'Meara made the maintenance of honesty and integrity a
top priority in his department. In his first annual report as
commissioner, he announced that he had found no trace of
corruption within the department, but that -the watch will
continue, and the punishment of the guilty, if any, will be as
severe as the laws of the State, as well as the rules of the
department, will sanction." Five years later, O'Meara proudly
reported that since he had assumed command of the department, only
one officer had been convicted of accepting a bribe: the policeman
in question had been given two dollars in return for ignoring a
traffic violation. By the time of O'Meara's death in 1918,
Boston's police department had been recognized throughout the
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nation as a rare example of a city police force that maintained a
high standard of integrity and self-respect. O'Meara himself had
also earned a reputation for dealing fairly with his men.15
O'Meara likewise stressed the importance of remaining within
the law even while performing normal police duties. In the face of
tremendous pressure from reformers who demanded that the police
take more aggressive action to combat vices like gambling,
drinking and prostitution, O'Meara insisted that his men adhere
strictly to proper procedure. In his 1910 report, he wrote:

The steady purpose of this department is that the
policemen, above all persons, shall respect the
law; and if the time ever comes when...the police
assume authority which the law does not give to
them, and thus themselves become lawbreakers, the
people of Boston will be the sufferers....Boston
newspapers, and doubtless many citizens, criticize
at this time the Police Commissioner of Boston as
narrow and technical because he has Insisted
steadily, and still insists, that the police for
whom he is responsible shall follow the law at all
times, not their own impulses.

O'Meara taught his men to take both verbal and physical abuse from
irate citizens without responding in kind. He also made a point of
proclaiming that the use of physical or mental torture to extract
confessions from suspects, the so-called "third degree", which was
a fairly common practice in some departments, had "no place in the
Boston Police Department," and would not be tolerated.15
O'Meara's policies regarding rewards for his officers also
conformed to the teachings of the police reformers. The year
before O'Meara took office, a total of thirty medals had been
awarded to Boston policemen "for hazardous or dangerous service
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while in the performance of duty,* In addition to medals, the men
often received extra vacation time in recognition of particularly
brave or praiseworthy acts. O'Meara abolished these practices. *1
seek to convince the policeman that the best and bravest work that
he can do is expected of him always,* O'Meara explained. As a
result, he claimed, meritorious acts *have become every-day
matters." Expressing a similar sentiment, Fuld wrote, "When a
policeman saves a life at a burning building or stops a runaway
horse, he is merely performing routine police duty, for which he
is p a i d . " ^
O'Meara also modified the system of discipline employed by
the department. During 1905, the year before O'Meara took office,
105 cases were heard by department trial boards. In 58 of these,
the officer in question was found not guilty. Of the remaining 47,
26 were fined, five were demoted, seven were discharged, seven
received reprimands and two resigned. Acting on the belief that
frequent acquittals and minor punishments led the men to look
lightly upon the department's system of discipline, O'Meara worked
to minimize the frequency of such outcomes. He took liberal
advantage of the power, granted to the police commissioner in the
Reorganization Act of 1906, to dismiss complaints against a
policeman if, in the commissioner's opinion, the charges were
found to be *frivolous or otherwise without merit sufficient to
Justify formal hearing.* However, he also stiffened the penalties
for those officers who were found guilty of negligence or
wrongdoing. By 1908, O'Meara had reduced the number of trials to
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36, but of these, only nine ended in acquittal. Of the remaining
27, 14 resulted in dismissals and one in the resignation of the
officer in question. Thus, in 56% of the cases that did not result
in acquittal, the officer's career with the force ended, as
opposed to 19% in 1905. Viewing fines, the most commonly employed
means of punishment during the period before his appointment, as
excessively injurious to the officer's family, O'Meara eliminated
this form of punishment and replaced it with extra, unpaid duty
assignments, at times assigning up to 210 hours of punishment duty
for a single offense. In 1908, seven officers received this form
of punishment. During the course of that year, however, O'Meara
dismissed charges in 49 cases in which he felt a trial was not
warranted. During O'Meara's adninistration, department trial
boards heard an average of 25 cases per year, down from 85 per
year during the seven years before he took office. On the average,
O'Meara dismissed 29 complaints, or over half of the complaints
lodged against officers, without a trial each year. However, the
acquittal rate fell from over 50% to 30%. O'Meara hoped that this
policy would "cause a complaint and summons for trial to be
regarded by members of the force as a matter of great gravity, and
to deter them from the commission of petty offenses, the penalty
of which they can no longer expect to be also petty." O'Meara's
discipline policy appeared to have had the effect that he
intended: the number of officers who were punished for
disciplinary infractions fell from an average of 42 per year (1899
to 1905) to 17 per year <1907 to 1918).
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Finally, like the advocates of police reform, O'Meara lobbied
for the elimination of police duties that were unrelated to crime
fighting. In this struggle, however, he did not always receive the
cooperation of the state legislature. While, in 1906, the
legislature released the police department from the responsibility
for Issuing liquor licenses, the next year it gave the department
Jurisdiction over the distribution of licenses for street vendors.
By 1912, the department was responsible for issuing 25,000
licenses a year to, among others, dog-owners, itinerant musicians,
carriage operators, and keepers of lodging houses. In 1907, the
legislature ruled that the department was to take on the task of
investigating the character and fitness of prospective Jurors, a
duty which required the police to make inquiries about and visit
the homes of 7000 of the city's residents in the first year alone.
O'Meara complained that "the police are proud of this increasing
trust which is reposed in them by the Legislature, but no one
outside the force itself seems to have thought that there is a
limit to the kind and the quantity of work which they can do." In
1916, the state relinquished the department from the
responsibility of compiling the list of the city's quarter of a
mi 11 ion voters, a task that occupied nearly the entire force for
several days each year. A year later, however, the state
legislature transferred responsibility for the listing back to the
police department over O'Meara's strenuous objections.1*
Compared to the structural reforms that were advocated by the
police reformers of the early twentieth century, the principles of
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professionalism were applied with far less consistency in the
nation's urban police departments* For example, while many police
departments raised the standards for new recruits and implemented
more extensive training programs, most cities were very reluctant
to accede to the reformers/ demands for increased salaries. With
over one thousand patrolmen on a police force, even a small salary
increase added a tremendous sum to the expenses of a large city
like Boston, and a raise for policemen usually sparked demands for
similar Increases from firemen and other municipal employees. So
police departments did not manage to raise salaries to a level
that was substantial enough to attract large numbers of
middle-class recruits. In most departments, however, discipline
and accountability received far greater emphasis than they had
earlier. Likewise, the number of services unrelated to crime
fighting for which the police were responsible generally declined
during the late 1800's and early 1900/s, although, as in the case
of Boston, the police department was still used to some degree as
a catch-all by public officials. Each police department's
administrator, of course, either chose to or was able to implement
only some of these reforms while he neglected others. In Boston,
for instance, the aspects of professionalism that were stressed
most vigorously were those that focused attention on the behavior
and integrity of the individual officer. Far less emphasis was
placed on issues like training and the Implementation of new
technology than was found in other police departments. Throughout
the nation however, and in Boston especially, professionalization
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communicated one message to the patrolman quite cl early* the
expectations that were placed on the police officer were to be
higher than ever

b e f o r e . 20

To some degree, professionalization also had an Impact on the
urban policeman's own perception of his Job, even though the
results of this change were not always quite what the reformers
had expected. Samuel Walker contends that "reformers succeeded In
stabilizing the career patterns of police officers and introducing
the first rudimentary sense of police work as a profess1on."21 The
Boston Globe observed in 1918 that visitors to the city remarked
on the Boston policeman's "pride of profession.-22 The majority of
Boston's policemen seem to have viewed police work as a long-term
career, not simply as a Job to be held until something better came
along. The typical new recruit was between 25 and 30 years of age,
and nearly all

left other occupations in order to Join the force.

As the information below indicates, the attrition rate for those
who completed their first year on the force was fairly low and
tended to decline, albeit haltingly, during the early twentieth
century:
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Year
appointed to
Boston Police
Force

Number
remaining
after 1 year
(N)

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913

123
70
13
98
90
42
37
111
145
88
51
57
103
82

Percent of N remaining:
5 years
15 years
10 years
after
after
after
appointment appointment appointment

93%
91%
92%
95%
90%
88%
92%
96%
95%
94%
96%
95%
96%
96%

79%
76%
77%
87%
83%
79%
64%
90%
91%

68%
67%
62%
76%

Absenteeism likewise remained low and generally declined during
this period:

Average daily absence rate for Boston Police Department
1891-1918

1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899

2.65%
3.10%
2.92%
2.43%
2.05%
2.07%
2.13%
2 .21%
2.83%

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

2.17%
2.18%
2.14%
2.24%
2.02%
1.92%
1.77%
2.23%
1.61%
1.68%

1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918

1.83%
1.62%
1.91%
1.85%
1.69%
1.80%
1.85%
1.75%
2.17%

This data, taken together with the decline in the number of
officers convicted by department trial boardsi, indicates that the
typical policeman of early twentieth-century Boston planned on
remaining with the department for a significant portion of his
working life and, whether due to an increased commitment to his
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profession or to the tighter discipline of the O'Meara years,
appeared to execute his duties as a policeman with an increasing
consc1ent1ousness.23
In fact, policemen throughout the country experienced an
upsurge in occupational

identity at this time. National

periodicals directed not at reformers and administrators but at
the patrolmen themselves appeared during this period. Among these
were the National Police Magazine, founded in 1912, Pol Iceman's
Monthly, established in 1915, and Policeman's News, which first
appeared in 1919. Between 1890 and 1915, police departments in
most large cities also formed policemen's fraternal or benevolent
organizations. These groups provided rank-and-file patrolmen with
death benefits and health insurance, as well as social and
recreational activities. In general, these organizations operated
Independently of the police department itself. The policemen in
Boston formed such a group, which they named the Boston Social
Club, in 1906. Its membership was open to any of the city's
patrolmen but was closed to officers of higher rank. In 1915, a
national Fraternal Order of Police was created, and many of the
local clubs affiliated themselves with this organization.24
Nevertheless, professionalization also generated frustration
among the nation's policemen. Many policemen deemed the new
policies to be impractical, unnecessary and unsolicited
interference with a system which, in their eyes, had worked well
for years. The end of partisan influence in the force, the
elimination of many of the services that the police had

53

traditionally provided, and the new attention to the eradication
of corruption all robbed the patrolmen of many long-standing
avenues for supplementing their salaries through petty graft, but
the reformers7 failure to convince city governments to
significantly increase the patrolmen/s legitimate salary meant
that little was done to replace the income that was lost due to
the elimination of such practices. Furthermore, the higher
standards

of conduct demanded by the professional

increased

the demands that were

ideal not only

placed on the patrolmen but also,

at times, confronted the policeman with conflicting expectations.
For example, the police were told to behave like a military outfit
that was waging a war on crime but, at the same time, they were
instructed to respect the constitutional rights of the suspect, to
refrain from the improper use of force, and to stay within the
bounds of

the law at all times.

At thevery moment that he was

told that

he was chosen because

of his unique abilities and that

he should be proud of his important position as the community's
crime-fighting expert, the policeman was subject to increasing
scrutiny and was held ever more accountable by his superiors, thus
limiting his discretionary power. Finally, the services that were
eliminated when the scope of police work was narrowed, services
such as returning lost children or providing aid to the poor,
often tended to be those functions that brought the policeman into
the closest and most positive contact with the working class from
which he originated. While enabling the patrolman to focus his
attention on crime fighting, then, professionalization also served
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to alienate the policeman from his own social group. His
interaction with the rest of the working class took on a
predominantly negative cast, since, in most cases, it now involved
either arrests or the forceful maintenance of order.26
In the end, professionalism surrounded the patrolman with
contradictions. It focused great attention on the discretionary
aspects of police work, while at the same time it demanded
adherence to Increasingly rigid procedural regulations. It made
strides toward upgrading the patrolman's skills,

leading him to

expect greater freedom of action, and then it placed him under
closer supervision than ever before. It impressed upon him the
idea that, somehow, his role was more important than most, but
then it used this same argument to deprive him of rights that were
exercised by other citizens. It encouraged him to take pride in
himself and his work, but then it demanded that he drastically
alter both his behavior and his attitudes. It sent him into the
neighborhood in which he had grown up and Instructed him to remain
strictly Impartial. It made extraordinary performance the expected
norm. It led him to expect more from his Job at the very moment
that it popularized the idea that it was the policeman's duty to
obediently make any sacrifice that his community demanded of him.
Perhaps most significantly, however, it tried to instill

in him a

middle-class dedication to a career that brought him a salary and
a social status that were no greater than those of the average
ski 1 led worker.26

55

Reformers and police administrators were relatively
unsuccessful

In their attempts to reshape the patrolman and make

him fit into their professional model. Samuel Walker and Eric
Monkkonen contend that, while the reformers were quite successful
at professionalizing police executives, they never completely
eliminated the working-class nature of the policeman's values and
attitudes. This, of course, just added to the tensions within the
police department. While professionalization did generate a
significant degree of frustration for the policeman, however, it
also gave him a desire to correct those aspects of his work that
he found dissatisfying. As Walker points out, a worker who views
his Job as temporary is likely to seek a better occupation if he
is unhappy with the present one. A person who perceives his Job to
be a life-long career and who identifies himself with that career
will seek resolutions within his field of work. The growing
occupational

identity apparent among the patrolmen of Boston and

other cities implanted in them a willingness to agitate within
their departments for improved working conditions instead of
looking to other occupations for these improvements. This type of
behavior, of course, did not resemble the pliant obedience
expected by reformers and police administrators. 27
In addition, their growing occupational

identity gave

policemen a vehicle through which to voice their dissatisfaction
in the shape of the policemen's clubs which emerged during this
period. These agencies eventually came to serve as policemen's
advocates, communicating the patrolmen's grievances to police
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officials and lobbying, sometimes successfully, for outcomes that
were In the patrolmen/s best Interests. In 1907, for example, the
Boston Social Club was able to convince the state legislature to
pass a bill guaranteeing each patrolman one day off in fifteen.
Reformers and ackninistrators looked upon this with great concern.
In

1912, the reformer George McCaffrey made the following

observation about the Boston Social Club:

A line of activity of more doubtful value, into
which the club has been led, is the pushing of the
wants of patrolmen...1 sincerely hope that this
kind of activity will not become so prominent that
it will be necessary to dissolve a unique
organization, otherwise very commendable.28

Such activity laid the foundation for the police union movement
that was to emerge during World War I. In the days before police
reform, when the policeman's position had been wholly dependent
upon his ability to remain in favor with the politicians who
appointed him, union activity by patrolmen had been inconceivable.
Samuel Walker points out that the irony of the police reform
movement lies in the fact that professionalization made police
unionism possible and, in Walker/s opinion, inevitable.29
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CHAPTER IV

DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

While the professional

ideal led police departments to expect

more from their patrolmen, it also prompted patrolmen to expect
more from their Jobs. As a result, a significant gap began to
develop between the level of compensation that the patrolman
expected in return for the higher levels of performance demanded
of him and the actual compensation that police departments
offered. This gap widened during the first twenty years of this
century, generating an increasing amount of dissatisfaction within
the ranks of police departments throughout the nation. Although
expected to display more self-control and a greater dedication to
his work than the average working-class employee, the policeman
was granted neither a salary nor a level of respect that would
have provided him with a social status above that of the skilled
worker. The policeman's new occupational awareness, a legacy of
the professionalization movement, eliminated any inclination he
may have once had to Just passively accept these circumstances.
When the economic impact of World War I threatened to further
undermine both their financial security and their relative social
standing, policemen throughout the United States decided to take
action in defense of their own interests.
The policemen of Boston shared in the growing discontent
observable within the ranks of the nation's urban police
departments. To some degree, their grievances can be attributed to
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conditions that resulted from the various reforms to which the
department had been subjected between 1885 and 1915. The arrival
of World War I only served to exacerbate these problems. At the
same time, the conditions that these reforms had created closed
most of the avenues of redress which, under other circumstances,
might have enabled the policemen to secure acceptable solutions to
their problems. Finally, the command structure that had emerged as
a result of the reforms made the chances for the resolution of
discord within the department largely dependent upon the police
commissioner's attitudes, on his relationship with the
rank-and-file patrolmen, and on their perception of the degree to
which he sympathized with their needs. During the adninlstration
of a commissioner who was capable of winning the respect of the
patrolmen, a commissioner like Stephen O'Meara, for example,
discontent could be contained. Under O'Meara's successor, Edwin U.
Curtis,

it could not.

The establishment of state control over the Boston Police
Department was, to a significant degree, responsible for the rise
of many of the conditions that generated dissatisfaction among the
city's policemen. State control, implemented as a means of
shielding the department from the Influence of local officials,
did have the effect desired by its promoters. The Boston Police
Department's ability to operate with a minimum of
politically-motivated interference earned it national recognition
during the early 1900's. The very success of this reform, however,
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hampered the department's ability to Improve working conditions
for its own patrolmen.
During the late 1600's, state governments eagerly assumed the
authority for appointing city police officials. They were not so
eager, however, to begin footing the bill for the police
departments. As a result, while they stripped city officials of
the right to choose police acknlnlstrators, they forced the city
governments to retain the responsibility for financing the police
departments. Fearing that city officials would simply undermine
the power of the state-appointed police acininistrators by grossly
underfunding the departments, most legislatures that instituted
state control passed accompanying legislation mandating that city
officials fully fund all requisitions made by the police
commissioners. In Kansas City, the city council was required by
state law to appropriate sufficient funds to cover the board of
police commissioners' estimate of expenses for the coming year,
and then to fully fund any additional requests made during the
year to cover expenses that were not foreseen when the board's
original estimate was made. Members of the municipal assembly in
Saint Louis could be fined $1000 and could be forever disqualified
from holding municipal office as punishment for refusing to fully
fund the budget submitted by that city's police board. City
officials protested that such measures promoted unrestrained
spending of city funds by an administrator who was not responsible
to the city or to its voters. This, they argued, could easily
drive a city to bankruptcy. In response to these complaints, some
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states enacted legislative safeguards designed to offer a degree
of protection to city treasuries. Host often, these came In the
form of limits on the number of men that a police department was
allowed to employ.*
The General Court of Massachusetts,

like most other state

legislatures, passed measures designed to ensure adequate funding
for the police department when it established a state-controlled
police board for Boston in 1885. According to section 4 of chapter
323 of the state laws of that year, "all expense for the
maintenance of buildings, the pay of the police and all incidental
expenses incurred in the acknlnistration of the said police shall
be paid by the said city of Boston upon the requisition of said
board." The state legislature, however, granted city officials an
unusual degree of control over certain portions of the police
department/s budget. According to section 5 of the same law:

said board of police shall not appoint any larger
number of patrolmen than the present police
commissioners of said city are now authorized to
appoint, except as authorized by said city, nor
shall the pay of the police be increased or
diminished except by the concurrent action of said
city and said board of police.2

While municipal officials in many cities with state-controlled
police departments had the power to limit the size of the police
force, it was not so common for them to have such direct control
over the salaries of the departments personnel. The 1906 act
replacing the police board with a single police commissioner
further specified that only the mayor was to have the power to
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authorize an expansion of the police force and that the
policemen's salaries could only be altered by concurrent action of
the mayor and the police commissioner. The only salaries that
could be raised or lowered without the mayor's consent were those
paid to the police commissioner and the departments
superintendent. These salaries were to be set by the governor and
the state legislature but paid by the city. Thus, municipal
officials were prevented from attempting to alter a police
commissloner's policies by using his salary as a source of
leverage. The 1906 law also reaffirmed the mandate that required
the city to fully fund all expenses incurred by the police
department upon the request of the police commissioner.3
Not only was the mayor able to control both the size of the
force and the salaries paid to the men, but the city also retained
the power to set the rates for the policemen's pensions. The mayor
of Boston was thus able to exercise considerable control over
those portions of the police department's budget that had the most
direct impact on the patrolmen. During the years from 1900 to
1920, spending for salaries and pensions constituted the
department's two largest expenses. Together they generally
accounted for 85% to 90% of the police department's annual budget.
This gave city officials considerable control over the police
department's total expenditures, and they did not hesitate to
employ this power in order to minimize the department's cost to
the city. In 1915, for example, the city's appropriations to the
police department constituted a smaller share of the city's budget
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than did similar appropriations In the two other cities of
comparable size that had state-controlled police departments.
While Baltimore allocated 13.0% of Its budget to the police, and
Saint Louis appropriated 14.8%, the Boston Police Department
received only 11.3% of the funds distributed by the city that
year. Philadelphia, whose department was under direct local
control, devoted 13.8% of its budget to police expenses.
Throughout the late 1800's and into the twentieth century,
however, the mayors of Boston repeatedly argued for even stricter
limits on the department's spending. Shortly after his election in
1898, Mayor Jos1ah Quincy, for example, unsuccessfully pushed for
a bill that would have prevented Increases in police department
spending from exceeding increases In the city's financial
resources.4
Unable to directly control other police department decisions
or to utilize the department as a source of patronage, Boston's
mayors rarely saw a reason to authorize increases in those
portions of the department's budget that were under their control.
Increasing the amount of money allocated to the police, after all,
might require reducing the funds promised to those departments in
which the mayor and council still retained some significant direct
influence. Hostility between the city's Democratic mayors and its
Republican police commissioners also introduced significant
tension whenever the city's budget was redrawn. In fact, in spite
of laws to the contrary, the city government sometimes even tried
to avoid funding those portions of the police budget that were
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beyond its control. For example, in 1910, shortly after he had
succeeded in blocking Mayor John J. Fitzgerald's attempt to
appoint four special police to the force, O'Meara was forced to
write a letter to the mayor to complain that the sum appropriated
by the city for the operation of the department during the coming
fiscal year was less than the amount that O'Meara had requested.
Eventually, Fitzgerald acceded to the police commissioner's
request and granted additional funds to make up the deficiency in
the original appropriation. For all but two of the years that
O'Meara served as police commissioner, the mayor's office was
occupied by either Fitzgerald or his rival within the Democratic
Party, James Michael Curley. According to Francis Russell,
“neither Fitzgerald nor Curley was Interested in Improving the
conditions of a department over which they had no control and
through which they could parcel out neither Jobs nor favors.-5
As a result of such conditions, salary increases for the
patrolmen were few and far between. The salary scale that had been
established in the late 1880's, for example, was still

in effect a

quarter of a century later. In 1913, after four years of lobbying
by the Boston Social Club, Mayor Fitzgerald finally authorized the
adoption of a new scale shortly before he left office. According
to the new salary schedule, new recruits, known as reserve men,
were to receive $730 during their first year on the force, $821.25
during their second year and $912.50 during their third year.
During the second year, reserve men were eligible for promotion to
the rank of first-year patrolman, but since such a promotion
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depended upon the existence of a vacancy in that rank, men
sometimes remained in the reserve ranks a little longer than two
years. Once he attained the rank of patrolman, the officer
received a salary of $1000, which was Increased by $100 each year
until a maximum of $1400 had been reached. This salary scale had
originally been devised in 1898, but fifteen years of wrangling
within the ranks of City Hall had delayed the adoption of the new
schedule. During the intervening years, the cost of living had
risen by 37*. The pay Increase was also not enough to close the
gap between the salaries of the Boston Police Department and those
offered in other cities. In Baltimore, for example, first-year
patrolmen received $1014 per year, in Philadelphia $1037, in Saint
Louis $1080, in Pittsburgh $1095 and in New York $1250.*
Shortly after it was enacted, however, the pay increase came
under attack from City Hall. Curley succeeded Fitzgerald in office
in 1913. Early the following year, the mayor summoned Police
Commissioner O'Meara to his office and asked that the police
commissioner accede to the mayor's request that the pay Increase
be rescinded for 200 of the department's members. Curley justified
his request by claiming that the funds were needed by other
departments. The city's finance commission complained that the
previous mayor had timed the salary Increase "so as to embarrass
the succeeding administration.11 O'Meara, citing the detrimental
effect that such a move would have on morale, refused to give his
consent to the salary reduction. Furious with the police
commissioner's refusal to comply, Curley tried to have a bill
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Introduced Into the state legislature which would have given the
mayor the power to reduce police salaries without the concurrent
action of the police commissioner. The legislation was never
adopted, however, and O'Meara maintained his stubborn refusal to
accede to the wage cut, so the new salary schedule was retained.
The incident prompted O'Meara to write in his annual report for
that year:

the members of the force, after having waited
twenty-five years for increased salaries, after
having kept their claim continuously for four
years before the mayor, and after having had it
granted in two installments, are not likely to be
successful applicants for further increase in the
next twenty-five years.

The salary scale was not the only issue that troubled the
policemen of Boston during the early 1900's. Many of the men also
complained that excessive numbers of duty hours were required of
them. Day men worked 73 hours per week, night men 83 hours and
wagon men 98 hours. With the exception of the measure guaranteeing
one day off in fifteen that the Boston Social Club had convinced
the state legislature to pass in 1907, this schedule had been in
effect without change since the middle of the nineteenth century.
Duty details in the Boston Police Department were based on what
was known as the "three-platoon" system. One of the disadvantages
of this system was that it allowed the men shorter periods of
leisure time and required longer duty periods than the
five-platoon system employed by the New York City Police
Department. Boston patrolmen, for example, worked shifts of either
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seven or ten hours, while in the five-platoon system the maximum
length of a shift was six hours. Furthermore, in the five-platoon
system, each man was given one day off in five, Instead of one in
fifteen. In addition to the hours of regular duty, the policemen
were frequently called on to perform tasks such as appearing in
court or providing security for a parade on their days off. On
such occasions they were not granted additional pay to compensate
for the extra work. Until the summer of 1919, the patrolmen were
not even allowed to leave the city limits without permission from
their division captains in order to ensure their availability in
cases of emergency. According to Patrolman James Long, "We had no
freedom, no home life at all. Ve couldn't even go to Revere Beach
without the captain's permission."8
While their duty schedules remained unchanged during much of
the early part of the twentieth century, the amount of work
expected of the Boston police increased dramatically. Contrary to
the reform ideals of the day, the Massachusetts General Court did
not accede to O'Meara's requests that the department be relieved
of tasks unrelated to crime fighting. The state, in fact, often
added to the list of functions that the police were required to
perform. This did not mean, however, that the department neglected
to fight crime. On the contrary, in accordance with the teachings
of police reformers and the demands of local moralists, the Boston
Police Department intensified its efforts to rid the city of crime
and vice. The number of arrests made by the Boston Police
Department grew from 48,358 in 1905 to 108,556 in 1917, an
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increase of 124%. The combined number of patrolmen and reserve
men, on the other hand, rose from 1105 to 1467 during the same
period, an increase of only 33%. During this period, the Boston
police made twice as many arrests as the police in Baltimore and
Saint Louis, two cities of comparable size. This level of activity
taxed both the individual patrolman and the force as a whole. As
early as 1912, George McCaffrey observed that “the department is
somewhat undermanned and a considerable doubling up of routes is
necessary whenever any exceptional demands are made upon the
force.* World War I further increased the burden that was placed
on the police department. By November 30, 1917, the police had
performed more than 20,000 extra tours of duty in conjunction with
war-related activities that were beyond their normal scope of
responsibi1ity.9
O'Meara's attempts to convince city officials to increase the
size of his force, a precondition for reducing the patrolmen's
hours and work-load, generally met with failure. The 100
additional men hired in 1907 to enable the department to give each
patrolman one day off in fifteen constituted the only large
increment that the city authorized during this period. In August
1910, O'Meara said that an additional 119 men were urgently needed
by the force. Mayor Fitzgerald,

implying that any deficiency in

manpower was probably caused by mismanagement, responded to
O'Meara's request by saying, "It is fair to inquire whether the
city should undertake to augment its present police force at so
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heavy an expense until every measure for the development of
efficiency with the present numbers has been exhausted.
The city was also reluctant to adequately fund the
construction or repair of station houses, even though such work
was badly needed. In 1917, four of the 19 station houses were less
than five years old, but the rest were all from thirty to sixty
years old. The station house in Division 2 had been condemned
several years earlier. The city council drew up plans for a new
house, discarded those plans and drew up a new set, and then
shelved those as well. According to a report which 0 /Heara filed
with the city council

in 1917, ten of the houses were in need of

repair. Meanwhile, the men complained about vermin, overcrowding
and insufficient numbers of beds, bathtubs and toilets, especially
in the older houses located downtown. The city, however, failed to
act.11
Until 1917, therefore, the majority of the patrolmen's
complaints were the direct result of underfunding by a city
government that saw no need to spend large sums of money on a
department that it could not control. By the end of O'Meara's
administration, however, the men began to express dissatisfaction
with some conditions that originated within the department Itself.
They began to complain that division captains showed favoritism
when handing out work details and recommending officers for
promotion. Like the police reformers, the patrolmen began to
object to tasks such as the inspection of lodging houses, the
observation of the polls and the delivery of city tax bills which
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they increasingly came to regard as unrelated to real police work.
Furthermore, while the professional ideal may not have completely
transformed the patrolman's outlook, it did lead him to resent
some of the degrading personal errands, such as fetching meals and
newspapers, which his superiors often demanded of him.12
Thus, by the beginning of 1917 the policemen of Boston had
compiled a long list of grievances. Their discontent, however, was
to grow dramatically during the course of the next two and a half
years. The First World War had a devastating impact on the
policeman/s economic position. The war generated huge profits for
industry and a tremendous demand for labor that was translated
into dramatic wage increases for workers in private industry. For
policemen, firemen, and other public officials whose salaries were
not as responsive to fluctuations in the labor market, this
brought a significant decline in relative economic status. A
Boston policeman making the maximum weekly salary of $27 could
easily find himself arresting a worker who was making $75 to $100
a week at one of the city's booming shipyards or munitions
factories. By the time the war ended, veteran Boston policemen
were earning half as much as carpenters and mechanics. Motormen
and conductors on the city's streetcars, who occupied positions
that many of the policemen had held before they Joined the force,
were earning 50 cents a day more than veteran police officers.*3
An increased demand for goods, coupled with wartime
shortages, generated rampant price increases that posed an even
graver threat to the policeman's economic position. Between
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December 1914 and December 1919, the cost of living in Boston
nearly doubled. In 1919, the U.S. Department of Labor reported
that prices for basic foodstuffs sold in the city had risen by 81%
since 1913. The price of potatoes in Boston had risen from 1.8
cents a pound to 3.7 cents; eggs

were up from 32 cents to 67 cents

a dozen; the price of a pound of

pork chops had risen from23

cents to 45 cents. The patrolmen

were also hit hard by the

doubling of clothing prices, for

each man on the forcewas

required to provide his own uniform and various other pieces of
equipment. Wartime inflation pushed the total cost of these
Job-related purchases to an all-time high of $207, or one fifth of
a first-year patrolman/s annual salary. Unfortunately, the signing
of the armistice that ended the fighting in November 1918 failed
to provide any relief for the beleaguered patrolmen. Reconversion
to a peacetime economy took time, so the shortages and Inflation
persisted, accompanied now by staggering Increases in unemployment
as factories laid off workers and four million demobilized
soldiers re-entered the labor market.14
Wartime inflation prompted the Boston Social Club to begin
agitating for another salary increase in 1917. Police Commissioner
0 /Heara sympathized with his men but urged them to have patience;
the city was not likely to accede to their request while the war
was on. Then, on December 14, 1918, O'Meara died suddenly of a
cerebral hemorrhage.1®
During his tenure as police commissioner, O'Meara had earned
a great deal of respect both within Boston and throughout the
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nation. In its tribute to O'Meara published shortly after his
death, the Boston Globe wrote, "Before his first term had expired
It began to be noised about the land that Boston had a police
department of peculiar excellence."16 An article in Human Life had
referred to him as "Stephen O'Mearas Police Chief Extraordinary".
Both O'Meara and his department were praised for displaying a
degree of integrity and freedom from scandal rarely found in city
police departments of the day. When Governor Eugene Foss, the
Democrat in office at the end of O'Meara's first five-year term,
was urged by members of his party to replace the Republican police
commissioner, Foss responded, "show me a Democrat as honest, as
intellectual as Stephen O'Meara and I'll appoint him."17 Foss then
proceeded to reappoint O'Meara. The commissioner was also
well-liked by the men in his department. His Irish-Catholic
background provided him with an Important link to a large portion
of the force. Furthermore, as commissioner O'Meara had developed a
reputation for being firm but fair with his men. After his first
year in office, the Globe wrote, "members of the whole department
are frank in their expression of confidence in their
ruler....Today the commissioner is more popular with the

men than

any commissioner in recent memory.*16 O'Meara

himself showed his

concern for the well-being of his men when he

wrote:

All policemen and employees who ask to see the
police commissioner are received by him with
courtesy and a helpful spirit....In the past eight
years hundreds of members of the department have
discussed privately with the commissioner their
troubles and their aspirations.19
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While he demanded a lot from his men, O'Meara also openly
displayed his respect for them. His annual reports were filled
with comments that conveyed pride In the quality of his force and
in its performance. Actions such as his refusal to rescind the
1913 wage increase convinced the police that O'Meara looked out
for the interests of the men In his department and was willing to
defend them from any external threats. After his death, one of his
former patrolmen characterized O'Meara as "the fairest man anyone
could hope to deal with."20 His passing was mourned by both his
men and the community they served.
O'Meara's successor, Edwin Upton Curtis, had been cut from a
different mold. According to William Allen White, Curtis "embodied
the spirit of traditional
Republicanism, traditional

inherited wealth, traditional

inherited

inherited skepticism about the capacity

of democracy for self-government, and a profound faith in the
divine right of the propertied class ultimately to

r u l e . "2*

Curtis

was from a Yankee family which had settled in Roxbury seven
generations earlier. In 1882, he completed his studies at Bowdoin
College in Maine, and three years later he began practicing law.
His political

interests and his loyalty to the Republican Party

led him to take a position as secretary for the party's Boston
City Committee, and in 1889 he was elected city clerk. Five years
later, at the age of 33, Curtis became the youngest man ever to be
elected mayor of Boston. Upon completion of his one-year term,
however, Curtis was defeated in his bid for re-election by Jos1ah
Quincy III, who had the support of Martin Lomasney and other
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Democratic ward bosses. Curtis was never again to be nominated for
elected office. He did, nonetheless, hold a series of appointed
posts: In 1896, he was appointed to the Metropolitan Park
Commission, in 1906, he was made assistant U.S. treasurer In
Boston, and in 1909 he was chosen by President Taft to serve as
collector of customs for the Port of Boston.22
Curtis had very little sympathy for the working class. As
mayor, he had been known for his hostility to organized labor.
Curtis was particularly suspicious of Boston's Irish. Their
emergence as a powerful political force had crowded old Yankee
families like his own out of power in the city, and it was their
leaders who had brought his own career in electoral politics to a
premature close. It was this man, described by one observer as
"stiff-necked as an old-time Salem preacher and stubborn as a
horse mackerel," who assumed command of the predominantly Irish,
working-class Boston Police Force at the very moment when
discontent within the force was mounting.^3
Succeeding in office a man as we 1 1-respected as Stephen
O'Meara would have been a challenge for anyone. From the outset,
however, Curtis's own actions rapidly undermined his relationship
with the men under his command. On December 30, 1918, the very day
that outgoing Governor Samuel McCall acbninistered the oath of
office to Curtis, the Boston Social Club held a meeting to discuss
strategies for securing a raise in salary. Although Curtis
personally supported a salary increase, his first public
statement, carried in the newspapers the next day, seemed to
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betray a certain lack of sympathy for the plight of his men. After
vowing to consult with the mayor on the subject of salaries,
Curtis said, "Knowing the membership of the department by
reputation we are confident that they will gratefully accept our
final decision." He went on to say that "any member of the police
department who is so dissatisfied that he cannot perform his work
faithfully, honestly, and cheerfully, pending the decision
regarding the requested salary Increase, may resign."24
Shortly after his appointment to office, representatives from
the Boston Social Club asked to meet with the new commissioner to
discuss the salary issue and a number of other grievances. Even
though he had never given the patrolmen's organization any say in
the running of the department, Commissioner O'Meara had always
been willing to discuss problems with the club's spokesmen.
Curtis, on the other hand, refused to meet with the men. Instead,
he established a new grievance committee to be made up of elected
representatives from each of the department's divisions. This
move, however, just generated more controversy. The ballots cast
in the elections to chose the new committee were counted in
private by the division captains and were reported secretly to the
commissioner. Rumors that, in at least one case, the returns had
been falsified flew through the department. The grievance
committee, as a result, never gained the confidence of the
majority of the patrolmen. The committee was also unable to
accomplish anything. It met once, on Curtis's order. No subsequent
meeting was scheduled, and when the president of the committee,
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Michael Lynch, asked when the next meeting would take place,
Curtis responded, “Search me!“25
Curtis did take steps to address some of the men's complaints
on his own. In the spring of 1919, for example, he created a
committee of officers of rank who were instructed to inspect and
report on the condition of every station house in the city. Curtis
then forwarded this report along with his own recommendations for
improvements to the mayor. Despite Curtis's insistence that
extensive repairs were “imperatively necessary", the city took no
action.26
At the same time, however, Curtis took steps that limited the
patrolmen's ability to protect their own interests. A few weeks
after the election of the grievance committee, Curtis imposed an
order that forbade the men to appear before the state legislature
without his permission. Since action by the state legislature was
required in order to alter the city's tax rate, Curtis's measure
limited the patrolmen's ability to argue in favor of the tax
increase that was necessary if they were to get a raise in pay.
That same spring, Curtis further angered the men when he used his
clout within the Republican Party to ensure that a state law
restoring a policeman's right to appeal departmental disciplinary
decisions to the courts included a passage that exempted the
Boston police from its provisions. Curtis's actions were seen as
an attempt to protect his own authority at the expense of the
interests of his men.2^
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Meanwhile, discussion about the men's salaries continued. In
1917, when the Boston Social Club had first begun to agitate for a
raise, the police had demanded an increase of $200. After numerous
delays, the city responded to the men's request In December 1918
by offering a new salary schedule that would have raised the pay
of men at the top and at the bottom of the existing scale but
would have left the salaries of one fourth of the force untouched.
At a meeting of the Boston Social Club the men rejected this plan,
voting unanimously to settle for nothing less than an additional
$200 for every member of the force. Michael Lynch, representing
the men, told Mayor Andrew Peters that financial distress was
forcing many policemen to look for jobs outside the department. In
an interview with local reporters, Lynch said that the men were
simply unable to make ends meet, and he insisted that "Boston
should live up to its high ideals." In February, Mayor Peters made
a counter-offer that would have given each man a 10% raise, or an
increase of up to $140 per patrolman. Again the men refused to
compromise. Commissioner Curtis also came out in favor of the full
$200 increase for all. Peters responded by offering a $200
increase for men at the top of the pay scale and $100 for all
others, but once again, the men rejected the offer. Finally, in
May 1919, Peters granted the demands in full, but griped that he
had no idea where the city would find the money to cover the
increase.28
The wage settlement failed to end the discontent within the
department, however. The raise, which amounted to an increase of
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between 14% and 28% for each man, was the first that had been
granted since 1913, and it did not come close to matching the 106%
increase in the cost of living that had occurred since that time.
In fact, during Just the two years since the Social Club had first
presented its demand for a $200 increase, food prices in Boston
had risen 27%. Vhile the new maximum salary for a patrolman was
set at $1600, government economists had determined that $1575 was
the minimum amount needed to sustain a family of five for a single
year. The wage adjustment, of course, also did nothing to
alleviate dissatisfaction over hours, promotions, discipline and
the condition of the station houses. Improvements in these areas
would require even more intense pressure on police and city
officials. The Boston patrolmen were convinced that they would
soon be forced to take action again.
The events of 1918 and 1919, in particular the protracted
struggle over their wage increase, convinced the policemen of
Boston that, if they hoped to continue to promote their own
Interests, they would need assistance. Relying on their own
resources no longer seemed sufficient. In the past, what little
protection they had enjoyed had been due to the sympathy of the
police commissioner and the severely limited pressure that the
Boston Social Club had been able to bring to bear on elected
officials. Once Curtis assumed office, the former seemed to vanish
and the latter was undermined. In the face of numerous slights and
perceived attacks on their position, the men quickly forgot about
the assistance Curtis had provided in their battle for higher pay.
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As the men saw it, Curtis, in his attempt to bolster his own
authority, had robbed them of whatever small amount of clout they
had once been able to exercise. Thus, at the same time that they
faced deterioration in both their working conditions and their
economic position, the policemen became convinced that they could
not count on support from the departments leadership. The history
of the past 34 years had taught them not to expect any
consideration from City Hall, and they were now forbidden to go
directly to the state to plead on their own behalf. Convinced,
then, that their future well-being depended upon their ability to
find new sources of pressure to bring to bear on the officials in
charge, the Boston police began to search for support from outside
the department. The working-class nature of both the patrolmen and
their grievances made it logical for them to turn to organized
labor for this support.
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CHAPTER V

FORMATION OF THE BOSTON POL I C E M E N S UNION

In turning to organized labor for assistance, the Boston
police Joined a police unionization movement that had spread
throughout the United States during the months Immediately
following the armistice that ended World War I. This movement, in
turn, was simply one small part of the massive upsurge In union
activity that followed the war. The goal of the policemen, In
fact, was to tap the growing strength of organized labor and to
use It to support their own fight for better working conditions.
Unionization, however, was not compatible with the goals of the
police reform movement. Affiliation with labor organizations,
reformers feared, would compromise the police departments
independence. Organized action by policemen, particularly action
designed to put pressure on superiors, was seen as a threat to
centralized decision-making. Lastly, the police union movement
made the failure of professionalization readily apparent. The
professional

ideal demanded that the patrolman obey his superiors

without question and that he dedicate himself to the effective
performance of his duties to the exclusion of all other
considerations. Unionization proved Just how limited the
rank-and-file patrolman's devotion to such principles really was.
Furthermore, the police union movement showed how unsuccessful
police reformers had been in their quest to eliminate
working-class values and attitudes from the police force. As a
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result, both the reformers and those officials who benefited from
the maintenance of a powerless rank-and-file stood adamantly
opposed to police unionization and used the arguments incorporated
in the reform ideal to combat it.
The period from 1915 to 1919 was one of rapid expansion for
American labor unions. During those years, union membership leaped
from 2.5 million to over 4 million. By far the largest labor
organization in the nation was the American Federation of Labor.
By the middle of 1919, the A.F.L, had grown to represent 3.2
million workers in the United States and Canada, an increase of
more than a half million over the previous year. Over 70% of the
unionized workers in the United States belonged to organizations
that were affiliated with the Federation. The A.F.L.

leadership's

cooperation with the war policies of the Woodrow Wilson
Administration, along with its success at parlaying participation
in the war effort into higher pay and improved conditions for
workers, had brought the A.F.L. tremendous prestige during the
war. After the war, the nation's economic troubles stimulated even
further growth as thousands of workers flocked to the A.F.L. in
hopes that the organization could protect the gains that they had
made during the war or could help them maintain their economic
position in the face of postwar inflation.1
Among the many who Joined the organized labor movement during
and after the war were thousands of public employees. Throughout
the United States, government agencies were either unable or
unwilling to provide their employees with the salary increases
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that were needed to keep up with the changing economic conditions
in the nation. As their earnings lagged farther and farther behind
those of workers in the private sector and as rising prices
undermined their standard of living, groups such as firemen,
teachers,

letter carriers, and government clerks formed unions and

affiliated with larger organizations such as the A.F.L. In 1916,
Boston's firemen transformed their benevolent organization, the
Russell Club, into a union and affiliated with the A.F.L. The
city's library employees formed their own union two years later,
and by the summer of 1919 the clerks at City Hall were also
members of an A.F.L. affiliate. All of these municipal employees
succeeded in Joining the organized labor movement without
generating very much controversy.2
In 1918, as the war produced heavier workloads and higher
grocery bills, and as they waged their frustrating battle to
secure a salary increase, some of Boston's patrolmen also
discussed the advisability of forming a union and seeking
affiliation with the A.F.L. When word of this reached Commissioner
O'Meara, he issued a general order dated June 28, 1918, which
read, in part:

The police department...exists for the impartial
enforcement of the laws and the protection of
persons and property under all conditions. Should
its members incur obligations to an outside
organization, they would be Justly suspected of
abandoning the impartial attitude which heretofore
has vindicated their good faith as against the
complaints almost invariably made by both sides in
many controversies.
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O'Meara called the policemen "their own best advocates" and went
on to conclude;

I cannot believe that a proposition to turn the
police force into a union, subject to the rules
and direction of any organization outside the
police department, will ever be presented formally
to its members, but if, unfortunately, such a
question should ever arise, I trust that it will
be answered with an emphatic refusal by the
members of the force who have an intelligent
regard for their own self-respect, the credit of
the department, and the obligations to the whole
public which they undertook with their oath of
office.3

Thus, O'Meara identified unionization as a move that ran counter
to the principles of departmental

independence and professionalism

promoted by the police reform movement, and he addressed the move
by making an appeal to the patrolmen's own commitment to these
Ideals. O'Meara had the order read to every policeman at roll
call, and he submitted it to the press. Talk of unionizing the
force soon died down.
During the summer of 1918, when talk of unionization was
first heard among the ranks of Boston's patrolmen, it would not
have been possible for the policemen to affiliate with the A.F.L.
anyway. For over twenty years, the leaders of the A.F.L. had
refused to grant charters to police unions. This policy had
originated in 1897, when the Federation's Executive Council
rejected an application for a charter that had been submitted by a
group of special police in Cleveland. The Council explained its
stand by saying, "it is not within the province of the trade union
movement to specially organize policemen, no more than to organize
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militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are too often
controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement."4
The upsurge of public employee militarism that accompanied
World War I brought the A.F.L.'s policy into question, however.
Problems similar to those experienced by the police in Boston had
persuaded policemen in numerous cities to seek support from the
A.F.L. They hoped that affiliation with an organization that had
such a large membership would enable them to bring the pressure of
thousands of voters to bear on municipal officials. So many
requests for A.F.L. charters were submitted by policemen's
organizations that a resolution was adopted at the 1917 A.F.L.
convention referring the question of police unions to the
Executive Council for further study. Since the 1890's, the A.F.L.
leadership, and in particular the organization's president, Samuel
Gompers, had grown increasingly cautious, so when the Executive
Council discussed the resolution at their Hay 1918 meeting, it was
no longer concern about the "forces" that controlled the police so
much as it was fear of the controversy that police unionism might
generate that prompted the Executive Council to announce, "it was
decided to reaffirm our former position that it is inexpedient to
organize policemen at the present time."^
This did not stem the tide of police unionism, however, and
policemen's organizations continued to seek membership in the
A.F.L. In Boston, talk of unionization was revived the following
winter when the men were embroiled in their salary negotiations
with Mayor Peters. On February 19, 1919, at a meeting attended by

84

over one thousand policemen, the members of the Boston Social Club
voted to seek affiliation with the American Federation of Labor
and empowered their executive board to take action on the matter.^
The following June, at the A.F.L.'s convention in Atlantic
City, delegates adopted another resolution regarding police
unions. This time, however, the delegates did not simply Instruct
their leadership to look into the question. The resolution passed
in Atlantic City commanded the officers of the Federation to begin
Issuing charters to police unions at once. Thus, over the
objections of Gompers and other leaders, the A.F.L. began to acinit
police unions to membership during the summer of 1919. The
response from pollcemen/s organizations was overwhelming. Vithin
nine weeks, the A.F.L. received applications from 65 policemen's
organizations in cities throughout the nation. By the end of
August, the A.F.L. had issued charters to 33 of these, including
organizations in Los Angeles, Washington, Jersey City, Saint Paul,
Richmond, Norfolk, Fort Worth and Portland, Oregon.^
Encouraged by the change in A.F.L. policy, the Boston police
intensified their efforts to form a union. By the last week of
July, petitions requesting a charter from the A.F.L. were
circulating in each of the nineteen station houses. When
Commissioner Curtis heard about the petitions, he issued a general
order condemning the movement. In this general order, dated July
29, 1919, Curtis invoked the memory of his predecessor by quoting
the entire text of the general order that O'Meara had issued the
previous summer. Curtis then added, *1 am firmly of the opinion
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that a police officer cannot consistently belong to a union and
perform his sworn duty." Since their duty was to carry out laws
passed by representatives of the entire population, he said,
policemen "should not be subject to the orders or the dictation of
any other organization...that comprises only one part of the
general public." Curtis finished by saying, "I feel it my duty to
say to the police force that I disapprove of the movement on foot;
that in my opinion it is not for the best interests of the men
themselves; and that beyond question it is not for the best
interest of the general public." Thus,

like O'Meara before him,

Curtis publicly condemned unionization as a threat to the Boston
Police Departments widely-touted Independence from outside
interference. The press agreed with the commissioner; nearly every
major Boston newspaper condemned the p o l i c e m e n s plans for
affiliation with the A.F.L. Curtis did not, however, go so far as
to expressly forbid the men from forming a union. Such a step, he
felt, was unnecessary. To Curtis, it was Inconceivable that the
patrolmen, whose duty was to show unquestioning obedience to their
superiors, would continue to pursue a course of action that
deviated from the announced wishes of the commissioner or that
challenged the commissionerS authority within open view of the
general public.®
Three days after Curtis issued his general order, fourteen
hundred members of the Boston Social Club met to decide what
action to take next. Commissioner Curtis was invited to address
the meeting but declined to attend, citing ill health. After
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reviewing the familiar list of grievances, the members of the club
voted on the issue of affiliation with the A.F.L. Of those
present, 940, or about sixty-one percent of the total number of
patrolmen and reserve officers on the force, voted In favor of
affiliation; all of the rest abstained. The club's officers
subsequently sent a telegram to the A.F.L. formally requesting a
charter, and on August 9, the charter arrived In Boston.*
Two days after the Boston

police received their

Curtis struck back. Up to this point, he had

charter,

limited himself to

merely expressing disapproval of the plans to unionize. Upon
learning that the men had received an A.F.L. charter, however,
Curtis decided to take action that would bring this affair to a
speedy close once and for all. On August 11, the commissioner
promulgated an addition to the department's rules. Curtis
announced the adoption of section 19, rule 35 in a general order
that began, "It is or should be apparent to any thinking person
that the police department of this or any other city cannot
fulfill its duty to the entire

public if its

to the direction of an organization existing

members are subject
outside the

department." A policeman, he said, "is not an employee but a State
officer." The new rule, he explained, was designed to prevent the
policemen and the department

from coming under the direction and dictation of
any organization which represents but one element
or class of the community. If troubles arise where
the interests of this organization and the
interests of other elements and classes in the
community conf1let,...[the officer] must fail in
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his duty as a policeman, or In his obligation to
the organization that controls him.

The new rule stated that "no member of the force shall Join or
belong to any organization...which is affiliated with or a part of
any other organization, club or body outside the department." The
only exceptions to the rule were veterans' organizations such as
the American Legion.10
By this point In the conflict, then, Curtis had defined the
primary issue upon which the battle over unionization would be
fought: affiliation with the A.F.L. would compromise the
Independence of the force. In the event of a strike involving
other A.F.L. members, the patrolman's own membership in an A.F.L.
affiliate might prejudice his actions, thus Jeopardizing the
impartiality which the reformers had taught was absolutely vital
if police service were to be effective. Curtis also invoked parts
of the professional

ideal which asserted that the policeman's

special position within the community meant that he could not
expect to be allowed the same rights to promote his own interests
that private employees exercised, and that acceptance of this
sacrifice was assumed when the officer took his oath of office.
Such sentiments were identical to those expressed by nearly every
police reformer of the day, many of whom Joined with police
actoinistrators and influential citizens to block the police union
movement.11
The Boston Social Club's next step was to seek legal advice.
They hired James Vahey, who was also counsel for the carmen's
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union, and John P. Feeney. The attorneys argued that Curtis's new
rule violated a Massachusetts statute forbidding employers to
compel employees to agree not to Join a union as a condition for
employment. Curtis's response was that the law did not apply to
policemen, for they were officers and not employees.12
Finally, the men decided to simply defy the commissioner's
order. The Boston Social Club scheduled a meeting for August 15 to
decide whether or not to accept the charter. The day the meeting
was to be held, Boston newspapers announced that, in a
none-too-subtle move to convince the policemen to abandon their
course, Curtis had Just authorized a rush order for the printing
of one thousand discharge and suspension forms. Rather than
intimidating the men, this, along with the other actions taken by
Curtis during the previous three weeks, simply Increased their
anger and their determination to defend their Interests. At the
August 15 meeting, they voted overwhelmingly to accept the A.F.L.
charter establishing Boston Policemen's Union no. 16807. Boston
now became the largest city in the nation whose police were
affiliated with the A.F.L. At an organizational meeting held three
days later, the new union elected its officers. The men chose John
Mclnnes, a former bricklayer and an ardent supporter of
unionization, to serve as their first president. On the morning
after the selection of officers, however, eight of the union's
leaders were summoned to headquarters for two and a half hours of
questioning. On August 21, Curtis announced that the eight men
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would be charged with Insubordination for violating section 19 of
rule 35.13
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CHAPTER VI

THE DECISION TO STRIKE

Reformers had been far more successful at reshaping
administrative structures than at molding policemen to resemble
the model that the reformers found most desirable. The Boston
Police Department exemplified to a large degree the ideals of
Independence and centralized authority advocated by the police
reformers. The result was the emergence of a police commissioner
who, though possessing little control over some key matters such
as the patrolmen's salaries, was completely autonomous in other
areas, in particular those regarding discipline and the general
management of personnel. Unaccountable to the city's government or
to its voters, free from Judicial

interference in personnel

matters, and appointed for a comparatively long term by a governor
whom he was likely to outlast in office, the police commissioner
was free to make any decisions which, in his view, would
contribute to the department's ability to operate with maximum
efficiency. The commissioner could make policy without having his
attention diverted by a need to garner support from city or state
officials, the patrolmen or the public, or by any other
considerations that were not directly related to the maintenance
of effective law enforcement and the conditions that facilitated
it. This narrowness of perspective, the reformers claimed, was
essential for the efficient operation of a police force and the
impartial enforcement of the law.
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In the crisis that was sparked by the Boston patrolmen's
decision to affiliate with the A.F.L., the autonomy possessed by
the police commissioner permitted Curtis to make a series of
decisions that prevented the implementation of a compromise which
may have averted the subsequent strike. As the conflict
progressed, maintaining discipline and respect for his authority
within the department became Curtis's overriding concern. Unlike
O'Meara, Curtis did not have the ability to accomplish this and,
at the same time, convince the men that he was concerned about
their well-being. Curtis's social outlook, his attitudes about his
men and his own role within the department, his inability to
present a more amiable public image, and the social distance
between him and the patrolmen all precluded this. As a result, the
only option available to Curtis was to force his men back into
line through a policy of direct confrontation and the unbending
execution of all departmental regulations. Others recognized that
the reaction of the policemen, whose mood was becoming
increasingly militant, was likely to have repercussions far beyond
the police department itself. Mayor Peters, for example, with an
eye toward the effect that a policemen's strike would have both on
his political career and on the city at large, threw himself into
the affair only to have his suggestions for a compromise cast
aside by the police commissioner. Instead, Curtis insisted on
nothing short of an unconditional surrender by the members of the
policemen's union. In the end, it was this inflexible stance
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assumed by the commissioner that eliminated any possibility of
preventing the policemen's strike.
Commissioner Curtis was not alone in his determination to
squash the union movement within his department. Municipal
officials and police executives in several cities whose policemen
had received A.F.L. charters put tremendous pressure on the
members of their departments in an effort to force them to
relinquish their charters. In August, Mayor Frank Hague ordered
Jersey City's Commissioner of Public Safety to suspend and bring
charges against the policemen who had promoted the plan to seek
affiliation with the A.F.L., along with any other officer who
subsequently Joined the union. In September, policemen in Buffalo
abandoned their plans to apply for an A.F.L. charter when the city
council passed an ordinance forbidding policemen to belong to a
union. City officials in Terre Haute, Indiana and Norfolk,
Virginia demanded that their policemen either return their
charters or resign from the force. In Washington, the Board of
Commissioners of the District of Columbia adopted a rule similar
to the one promulgated by Curtis. They were blocked from enforcing
the rule, however, when a restraining order was issued by Justice
Ashley Gould of the District Supreme Court at the request of the
Washington Policemen's Union, and when President Wilson
simultaneously requested that action be delayed until after the
conference of industrial and labor leaders which he had called for
October. Nevertheless,

in Detroit, the Fraternal Order of Police

lost its bid to secure a similar injunction to prevent the
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discharge of men who had promoted unionization of that city's
patrolmen. In all cases, the argument that the authorities used to
oppose the policemen's unions was the same as that invoked by
Curtis: affiliation with the A.F.L. would Jeopardize the
independence of the department and would preclude impartial
enforcement of the law by the policemen. As Mayor Hague put it,
"the members would be serving two masters."1
The hearings for the eight leaders of the Boston Policemen/s
Union took place on August 26. At the request of the union/s
attorneys, the hearings were not held before a trial board made up
of three division captains, as was customary, but before
Coranissloner Curtis himself. Vahey and Feeney wanted to be sure
that Curtis was forced to take full responsibility for the
decision, and Curtis himself had no objection to this. The union/s
attorneys argued again that the commissioner's new rule violated
state labor statutes and disputed Curtis/s assertion that a
policeman is an official and not an employee. They further argued
that affiliation with the A.F.L. would in no way Impede the
patrolmen's ability to perform their duties effectively, for it
would have no impact on the police commissioner's power to
institute disciplinary action in cases of neglect of duty. Upon
the completion of the testimony, Curtis announced that he would
take the matter under advisement. Three days later, hearings were
held for another eleven officers of the union. Again Curtis
delayed announcing his findings. Up to this point, the Policemen's
Union had made no official threat of a strike. However, all of
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Boston was talking about the possibility of a police strike should
the nineteen men be found guilty. Curtis had even taken steps to
prepare for such an eventuality. Three days before the first set
of hearings, the police commissioner had announced that a
volunteer police force would be formed to maintain order in the
city should an emergency

arise.2

During the summer of 1919, the mere mention of a strike by
any group of workers was taken seriously. Forces such as rampant
inflation, an organized labor movement whose membership was
growing by leaps and bounds, the disappearance of both the market
for war-related goods and the high profits that came with It, and
a determination by employers to rescind many of the concessions
that they had been forced to make to

workers

during

the period of

wartime labor shortages all combined to produce a year marked by
an Inordinate number of labor disputes. In 1919, there were 2,665
labor disputes involving 4,160,348 workers, or 22% of the nation's
work force. In every other year from 1916 to 1922, the number of
workers involved in strikes and walkouts remained between 1
million and 1.6 million. From actors to transit workers, from bank
clerks to steelworkers,

laborers in all walks of life seemed

infected by what some newspapers called "strike mania” . Several of
these strikes attracted nationwide attention. In February 1919,
Americans witnessed the nation's first significant general strike
as 60,000 workers responded to a call by the Seattle Central Labor
Council and walked off their Jobs insupport of the city's
striking shipyard workers. A similar Canadian strike also
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attracted a great deal of attention in the United States. The
general strike called by the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council

in

May to show their sympathy for striking workers in the metal and
building trades culminated in a virtual take-over of the city
government by the strike committee. In the United States, the
number of strikes mounted as the year wore on: there were 175
labor disputes in March, 248 in April, 388 in May, 303 in June,
360 in July and 373 in August. Then, early in September, Americans
braced for what promised to be one of the most disruptive strikes
of the year, a strike against steel manufacturers that would
eventually Involve 365,000

workers.^

Like residents of many parts of the United States, Bostonians
were particularly disturbed by the number of strikes that directly
affected their own area, where the frequency of strikes reached
its peak during the spring and summer of 1919. The Boston Evening
Transcript reported that the city experienced no fewer than forty
strikes during the period from April 30 to August 1 of that year.
These strikes Involved, among others, garment workers,
longshoremen, fishermen, carmen on the city's elevated railroads,
and even the horseshoers. In April, a strike by 20,000 telephone
operators tied up phone service throughout New England.
Furthermore, a threatened strike by the city's firemen, who were
working in conjunction with the police to secure a salary
increase, was averted at the last minute when the city announced
that the firemen would get a $200 raise along with the policemen.^
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Traditionally, strikes by American policemen had been quite
unusual, but during the twelve months that preceded the uproar
over the creation of the Boston Pollcemen/s Union, Bostonians had
heard about such strikes frequently enough to know that such an
event was possible. The police union movement that had emerged in
the United States in response to the combination of inflation and
fixed salaries had also surfaced in Canada and in Great Britain,
where similar conditions prevailed. As a result, all three nations
experienced police strikes during 1918 and 1919. These strikes
were generally the result of official opposition to collective
action by policemen. The first of these strikes occurred in August
1918, when 6000 members of London's Metropolitan Police Force went
on strike after a member of the force had been dismissed as
punishment for his union activity. The strike brought the men a
substantial pay increase and a promise from the prime minister
that the dismissed officer would be reinstated. One month later,
450 policemen in Cincinnati staged a walkout and announced plans
to seek affiliation with the A.F.L. in response to the suspension
of five fellow officers. Four of the men had been suspended for
their part in organizing a meeting to discuss strategies for
obtaining a salary increase, an event which had led to a scuffle
between patrolmen and inspectors. The fifth was punished when, in
a conference with the chief of police held to discuss the original
suspensions, he likened the chief's administration to autocratic
rule in Germany. The city's safety director initially threatened
to dismiss each one of the striking policemen. The strike ended
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after three days, however, when the mayor offered a settlement In
which city officials agreed to allow the strikers to return to
work without punishment and to consider reinstating the suspended
officers in return for a promise that the men would relinquish
their plans to affiliate with the A.F.L. In December of the same
year, a strike by Montreal policemen, who demanded higher wages
and union recognition, sparked several days of looting and
rioting. Finally, in August 1919, as Bostonians watched the
conflict between their own police and the city's police
commissioner unfold, police strikes over union recognition erupted
again in England, resulting in disturbances in London and two
nights of rioting in Liverpool, where troops finally had to be
summoned to restore order.®
By the end of August, Bostonians were discussing not only the
likelihood of a policemen's strike, but also the very real
possibility that the city's organized workers as a whole would
stage a general strike on behalf of the policemen. On August 16,
the day after the policemen voted to accept the A.F.L. charter, a
headline in the Boston Herald announced that the city's labor
leaders planned to stage a general strike if Curtis were to
dismiss even one of the officers on trial. The next day, the
Boston Central Labor Union, the coordinating body representing the
more than 125 A.F.L.

locals in the city, held its largest meeting

in over a decade. The delegates issued a resolution announcing,
"We bid a hearty welcome to the Policemen's Union to the ranks of
organized labor, and we urge them to maintain their position and
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promise to them every atom of support that organized labor can
bring to bear in their behalf." The delegates demanded that Curtis
revoke his rule concerning affiliation with outside organizations,
condemning it as "un-American and hostile to the Interests of all
American workers," and as "a tyrannical assumption of autocratic
authority." The B.C.L.U.'s business agent, P. Harry Jennings,
aroused the crowd even further by declaring that "every man and
woman must be ready to make any sacrifice to assist the
policemen." The delegates then selected a committee of 17 to
prepare plans for assisting the policemen in their quest for
recognition of their right to unionize.6
The B.C.L.U. itself did not have the authority to call a
general strike without the approval of the local unions it
represented, but by the end of August, many locals were making
veiled or, at times, open threats to strike if the leaders of the
policemen's union were discharged. On August 20, the Herald
announced that all of the city's major unions, including the
telephone workers, the teamsters, and the workers in the building
trades, were willing to participate in a general strike which, the
Herald predicted, could involve as many as 80,000 of the city's
workers. During the last two weeks of August, the newspaper
announced that the Plumbers' Union, the Boilermakers' Union, the
Machinists' Union of Hyde Park, and the Street Car Men's Union had
all voted to quit work if necessary to support the police. Two
days before Curtis heard testimony in the case of the first eight
officers, the B.C.L.U. held another meeting at which the delegates
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unanimously pledged themselves to support the police in any action
they may be compelled to take. Again the press interpreted this to
mean that the unions would participate in a general strike. Day
after day, the newspapers reprinted union leaders7 statements of
encouragement for the police, their pledges of support, and their
Increasingly belligerent attacks against Curtis. The fervor of
these statements and the large number of unions that issued them
convinced many in Boston that a severe punishment for the
policemen would lead to a complete shut-down of businesses and
services In the city.7
Among those who were most concerned about this state of
affairs was Mayor Peters. The mayor was eager to avoid any
situation that might result in a complete disruption of the city's
daily life, as had happened in Seattle and Winnipeg, or, worse, in
the type of violent chaos that had reigned in Montreal and
Liverpool. On August 27, Peters issued a statement expressing his
support for Curtis's position. He reiterated the idea that
affiliation with the A.F.L. would lead to ■comp1icat ions*, and he
announced his hope that the Federation and the policemen would
voluntarily relinquish their plans. However, he also laid the
groundwork for a possible dialogue with the patrolmen when he
announced that "no one would deny them the privilege of forming
among themselves an association which would enable them to secure
the benefits of collective bargaining." That same day, Peters
appointed a committee of thirty-four influential citizens to draw
up a plan to settle the dispute between the policemen and the

100

commissioner and to thus prevent a strike. Peters appointed James
J. Storrow, a prominent Investment banker and,

like the mayor, a

member of the Democratic Party, to head the committee. Storrow's
first action as chairman

was to issue a statement similar to the

one that had been issued

by the mayor. In this statement, Storrow

made clear his opposition to a police union affiliated with the
A.F.L., again citing the danger that this would pose to impartial
enforcement of the law, but stated that he saw no objection to the
formation of "their own independent and unaffiliated
organization." Storrow's

second action as chairman was to reduce

the unwieldy committee of 34 to

a much more manageable

subcommittee of three.®
Storrow and his subcommittee began the process of hammering
out a settlement by meeting with representatives of the Boston
Policemen's Union and their attorneys. In a series of meetings
that began on August 30, the two groups discussed the working
conditions within the police department. While Storrow sympathized
with the policemen's grievances, he continued to Insist that the
only type of organization that would be acceptable was one that
remained independent of any body outside the force. President
Mclnnes of the union countered that the police already had such an
organization in the Boston Social Club, but that the club had
become ineffective as a means of improving working conditions. The
union leaders were determined to hang on to their charter. Mclnnes
told Storrow, "if we must strike for our rights,

it will be a

struggle to the finish." It was the first time that the union's
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officials had openly stated that the conflict might lead to a
strike.9
Eventually, however, the union's attorneys began to advise
the men that there was little likelihood of an agreement that
would allow them to keep their charter. Police unions in New York
City and Buffalo had already abandoned their plans to affiliate
with the A.F.L., and police unions in numerous other cities were
under great pressure to do likewise. Instead of trying to retain
the charter, attorneys Vahey and Feeney urged the union's leaders
to use the issue of affiliation as a bargaining chip in order to
gain some form of guaranteed improvement in working conditions.^
By September 6, the Storrow Committee and the union's
attorneys had drawn up a compromise plan which they felt would be
acceptable to the union's leaders. The plan called for the Boston
Policemen's Union to relinquish its affiliation with the A.F.L.,
but to continue to operate as an independent organization “for the
purpose of assisting its members concerning all questions relating
to hours and wages and physical conditions of work." Second, the
plan called for the creation of a committee of three citizens to
be selected concurrently by the mayor, the police commissioner and
the policemen's union. This committee was to investigate working
conditions within the department and to report its findings to the
mayor and the commissioner. The plan also called on the police
commissioner to agree to meet with representatives of the union
whenever union leaders felt that a grievance needed to be
discussed. If at any time in the future the commissioner and the
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policemen's union could not reach an agreement on a particular
Issue, another citizens' committee was to be formed to investigate
the problem and to issue recommendations. The Storrow Committee's
report, however, expressly stated that this system of conflict
resolution was not to be applied to disputes concerning
disciplinary action. The plan went on to forbid discrimination by
police officials against union members or by union members against
non-members. The final provision of the plan stated that "no
member of the Boston Policemen's Union should be discriminated
against because of any previous affiliation with the American
Federation of Labor."11
The Storrow Committee's compromise plan satisfied the
commissioner's demand that the police remain independent of
outside organizations while still providing the men with a new and
potentially more effective apparatus for securing relief when
grievances arose. The final provision also would have prevented
the impending show-down between the police and the commissioner by
compelling the commissioner to drop the charges against the
nineteen members of the union. On September 6, Storrow submitted
his committee's plan to the mayor, who immediately forwarded it to
Curtis with the endorsement that, "it affords a speedy and, it
seems to me, satisfactory settlement of the whole question."
Meanwhile, Vahey and Feeney brought the compromise proposition to
the union's leaders and urged them to approve it. Later, Storrow
said that he had been confident at the time that the union's
leadership was inclined to approve the plan. Vahey and Feeney also
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agreed to address a meeting of the full membership of the union at
which they planned to advise the men to vote in favor of the
compromise. When the clty/s Chamber of Commerce received a copy of
the compromise proposal, they gave It their full support and
offered to assist in the effort to convince the state and
municipal officials concerned to approve the terms of the plan.*^
By the time the Storrow Committee submitted its
recommendations to the mayor, Curtis had already announced that he
would issue his findings in the cases of the nineteen men on
Monday, September 8. Convinced that a negative finding would
precipitate a strike, Storrow and Peters hoped to secure the
commissioner's acceptance of the compromise as soon as possible.
Shortly after Curtis received a copy of the proposal on Saturday,
September 6, however, he left Boston for his home in Mahant, where
he remained for the duration of the weekend. When they failed to
receive an answer from Curtis concerning the proposal, Peters and
Storrow decided to present the plan to the press with the hope
that favorable public opinion might convince the commissioner to
grant his approval to the plan. Bostonians were thus able to read
the Storrow Committee's report in their Monday morning papers. In
the editorial pages of every one of the city's major morning
newspapers, the compromise plan received unqualified support. The
Boston Essl, a Democratic paper with a high readership among the
city's Irish working class, called the plan "a happy solution of
the whole difficulty" and praised the fact that "there is neither
victory nor defeat in it." The Post went on to say, “We trust it
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will be speedily agreed to by both sides." The Globe observed that
the plan provided the police with a way to ensure that their
grievances were addressed, but that "it does not take away from
the disciplinary power of the conxnissloner." "For either the
commissioner or the police to refuse this solution of the
difficulty would be a grave mistake," the Globe's editors
insisted. The conservative Boston Herald advised the men to give
up their A.F.L. charter, for under the terms of the compromise
plan, "they can have everything else that they are in reason
entitled to." The editors of the Herald concluded, "Mr.
Curtis...wi11 be most generous to accept this compromise, but we
expect him to do so, and should so advise him." The Boston
American called the plan "honorable and Just," and urged, "No one
should rock the boat. Least of all the public officials. No one
should stand upon technical rights.
To Curtis, however, the compromise represented at least a
partial retreat on several points which, in his mind, were
definitely not negotiable. By suggesting that the charges against
the nineteen officers be dropped, the recommendations of the
mayor's committee constituted an intolerable attempt by outsiders
to interfere with departmental disciplinary procedures.
Furthermore, granting the men a full pardon for actions taken in
willful defiance of departmental regulations, he felt, would
undermine the strict discipline that formed such an important
component of the professional model. The provisions safeguarding
the operation of an independent police union and forcing Curtis to
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discuss departmental problems with its leaders promised to create
conditions that would have posed another permanent challenge to
the commissioner's authority to run the department in whatever way
he thought best. Finally, the provisions calling for the
arbitration of future grievances by a citizens' committee, one of
whose members would have been appointed by the mayor, constituted
a violation of the cardinal rule of departmental

independence, for

It would have increased the role that the mayor played In police
department matters. The idea of allowing Democratic mayors to have
any more influence over the department than they already had was
intolerable to Curtis. Over the course of the preceding week,
Curtis had come to resent the interference by Storrow and Peters
in what to him was a matter of strictly departmental concern, but
now they were trying to force him to accept a solution which, in
his opinion, would significantly weaken the office of the police
commissioner.
So, in spite of the appeals from the press, Curtis, rejected
the plan outright. In a letter to Mayor Peters dated September 8,
Curtis wrote, "The commissioner can find nothing in the
communication...which appears to him to be either consistent with
his prescribed legal duties or calculated to aid him in their
performance.” Curtis also asserted that he saw no legitimate
reason for the compromise plan to affect his decision regarding
the charges pending against the nineteen officers. Later, in his
annual report for that year, Curtis further explained his
objections to the compromise. In the first place, he saw no reason
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to be negotiating with the union leaders at all. "I have never
been able to understand," he wrote, "why any one who approved the
rule and condemned the violation of it would have expected me to
dicker with its violators, or that I, rather than they, should
make the offer of compromise." He again insisted that the plan
could have no bearing on his disposition of the charges pending
against the officers, and that, therefore, "its merits could
properly come up for discussion only after the men on trial had
purged themselves of their violation of a rule of the department."
Concerning the proposed system for addressing grievances, Curtis
wrote, "nowhere in the statute by virtue of which the Police
Commissioner holds office is there any language that authorizes or
permits him to divide his authority and responsibility with any
one." Such a system would be incompatible with the commissi oner7s
duties under the law and "with the sense of responsibility to the
Commissioner which the members of the force must feel if proper
discipline and efficiency are to be maintained." Curtis rejected
the plan as

a reversion to the state of divided
responsibility, vacillating policy and dilatory
action, which prompted the Legislature to first
take control of the police force of Boston...and
then, later, to still further concentrate
responsibility by transferring the control to a
single commissioner.*4
On September 8, Curtis had the report of his findings in the
cases of the nineteen officers read by the division captains in
each station house following the evening roll call. The
commissioner found all nineteen men guilty of violating section 19
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of rule 35, and each was suspended indefinitely. At 9:45 that
evening, the members of the Boston Policemen's Union began
balloting to determine whether or nor a strike should be called.
The final vote was 1134 in favor of a strike, with only 2 opposed.
The strike was scheduled to begin the next evening. 15
Peters and Storrow, hoping to avert the strike at the last
minute, sought a way to convince Curtis to reverse his decision
and to accept the compromise. Their own personal prestige carried
no weight with the Republican police commissioner, and public
opinion seemed to have no impact on his decisions, so Peters and
Storrow asked Governor Calvin Coolidge for assistance. The
commissioner was a state official, so they had reason to believe
that Coolidge, both as governor and as a fellow Republican, could
exercise some Influence over Curtis when no one else could. Up to
this point, however, Coolidge had characteristically distanced
himself from the police controversy. Throughout the preceding
weekend, Storrow and Peters had tried to contact the governor, but
Coolidge had quietly left the city without leaving word of his
destination. On Monday evening he returned to Boston after having
delivered an address before the delegates to the Massachusetts
Federation of Labor's convention in Greenfield, in the western
part of the state. In his speech, Coolidge made no mention of the
Boston police controversy. That day, Peters forwarded a copy of
the Storrow Report to the governor's office with the request that
Coolidge give the plan his approval and use his influence to
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convince Curtis to do the same. Later that evening, Coolidge met
with Peters and Storrow to discuss the matter. ^
Coolidge, however, refused to interfere with the
commissi oner/s decision. In a letter to Peters dated September 9,
the day the strike was to begin, Coolidge wrote, "there has arisen
a confusion which would be cleared up if each person undertakes to
perform the duties Imposed upon him by law. It seems plain the
duty of Issuing orders and enforcing their observance lies with
the Commissioner of Police and with that no one has any authority
to interfere." Coolidge then remarked that if working conditions
within the police department were Inadequate, it was the
responsibility of the mayor and the city council to remedy the
situation. As for his own role, Coolidge observed, "There is no
authority in the office of the Governor for interference in the
making of orders by the Police Commissioner or in the action of
the Mayor and the City Council....I am unable to discover any
action that I can take." That same evening, Boston newspapers
carried the text of a telegram that Coolidge had sent to the
delegates of the Massachusetts Federation of Labor convention in
response to their request that Coolidge intervene on behalf of the
policemen. The telegram read, in part, "The Governor has no
authority over the appointment, suspension or removal of the
police force of Boston."17
Having exhausted all possible means of convincing Curtis to
modify his position, Peters and Storrow braced for the walkout.
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That evening, Tuesday, September 9, 1,117 of the 1,544 patrolmen
in the Boston Police Department went on strike.1®
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CHAPTER VII
THE STRIKE AND ITS AFTERMATH

During the first night of the strike, Boston experienced the
very sort of disorder that Peters and Storrow had hoped to
prevent. A night that began with a series of relatively harmless
pranks ended with widespread looting and vandalism in various
parts of the city. As a result of Curtis's earlier announcement,
"I am ready for anything", city officials had done nothing to
provide replacement protection should the policemen actually leave
their posts. Curtis himself, anticipating that the majority of the
policemen would remain loyal to the department, failed to mobilize
the volunteer force that the department had recruited during the
previous weeks. The next morning, Curtis requested that Peters
call out the state militia units stationed within the city to
quell the disturbances. The mayor complied with the request, but
then went a step farther. The 1885 law that had originally
established state control over the Boston Police Department
included a provision that empowered the mayor of the city to
assume temporary control over the department in times of riot and
disorder. Peters now invoked this provision. Commissioner Curtis,
as a result, suddenly found himself obligated to obey any orders
emanating from City Hal 1.1
By the following morning, order had been restored, but only
after two nights of looting and vandalism had generated $34,000
worth of damage claims from city businessmen. In addition, the
riots and the State Guard's subsequent efforts to disperse crowds
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and round up law-breakers resulted In a total of eight deaths.
Governor Coolidge, though, was distressed by the m a y o r s
assumption of control over the police department. So, when Peters
requested that the governor authorize the deployment of additional
state militia units from outside the city, Coolidge took the
opportunity to oust Peters from command in much the same way that
the mayor had dislodged the commissioner. On September 11, one day
after Peters had taken charge, Coolidge called out the entire
State Guard of Massachusetts and authorized their use to maintain
order in Boston. At the same time, he issued a proclamation that
placed the members of the Boston Police Department under his own
personal command and required them to obey any orders he might
issue. His first order commanded Police Commissioner Curtis to
recommence performing his regular duties and to "obey only such
orders as I may so issue or transmit." Years later, Coolidge wrote
in his autobiography that he had taken such steps because he
feared that, if Curtis had been superseded, "the men that he had
discharged might be taken back and the cause lost."2
The disorder that accompanied the walkout brought a deluge of
public condemnation down upon the striking policemen. The Boston
press universally censured the strikers. The Boston Herald
commented:

Any body of men, hired to protect the city and
sworn to defend it, that have no more moral sense
than to turn the city over to organized bands of
looters are of the sort that the sooner we are rid
of them the better. They never should have been
policemen. They never will be again, if the
community has an ounce of self-respect.
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The editors of the Evening Transcript insisted that "the blame for
Boston's black night rests primarily on the shoulders of the
members of the Boston Police force, who deserted their posts of
duty...and willfully and deliberately placed their fellow-citizens
at the mercy of a mob of thieves." The Transcript urged that the
police "not be allowed to escape proper punishment for their
criminal course." Even the Boston Post. which had shown greater
sympathy for the policemen's plight than the rest of the city's
major newspapers, blamed the striking police for "this saturnalia
of looting and reckless disorder," and pointed out that, "having
deserted their posts in a body, they can hardly expect the public,
which suffers so severely from their action, to approve of it."3
Numerous influential voices joined in condemning the strike.
The Boston Chamber of Commerce declared that, since "the patrolmen
deserted their posts of duty," they should all be discharged and a
new police force should be organized. The results of a survey of
seventeen sermons delivered in Boston churches on the following
Sunday showed nearly unanimous condemnation of the strike by the
city's clergy, as well. The Reverend Sydney B. Snow of King's
Chapel characterized the strike as an "obvious attempt on the part
of one class in society to wrest by violence the political control
into their own hands." The Reverend George R. Stair of the Dudley
Street Baptist Church praised Commissioner Curtis "for his
courageous stand in this matter," and went on to demand the
recruitment of "a new force, one purged entirely from the leaven
which has caused the present deplorable condition." The Reverend
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Cortland Myers of Tremont Temple told his congregation, "Not one
of the striking policemen of this city, who trampled on the solemn
oath they took to maintain law and order, should be put back on
his Job. I don't want to live In a city with such rotten
policemen.*4
Word of the strike quickly spread to a l 1 parts of the nation,
eliciting even more virulent criticism from the press and from
public officials outside the city. The Baltimore Sun wrote, "To
deliberately abandon a community to its enemies of the underworld
is as grave an offense morally as for a soldier to desert his
post." The Sun went on to urge Boston officials not to compromise
with the striking police. The editors of the New York Times
likewise invoked the military analogy so popular among the police
reformers, arguing, "A policeman has no more right to belong to a
union than a soldier or a sailor." The Philadelphia Inquirer
wrote, "Events in Boston have amply Justified the contention that
a body of men charged with the preservation of order has no right
to strike." Concerning police unionism, the Los Angeles Daily
Times declared, "When policemen and firemen are bound by oath to
organizations suspected of incendiarism, arson and
confiscatlon,...it follows that they become a menace to the public
peace Instead of a protection." The newspaper's editors then urged
the police commissioner of their own city to demand that the
patrolmen there either abandon their union or resign from the
police force. Even the liberal press, which normally looked
favorably on organized labor, expressed opposition to the police
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strike. The New Republic, commenting on the policemen's attempt to
affiliate with the A.F.L., wrote that, even though the Federation
"is no doubt more often right than wrong in its contests," this
did not alter the fact that "the state is not to be the Instrument
of a class....The Boston police, and anyone who may imitate them,
will have to be opposed." President Wilson likewise added his
voice to those in opposition to the strikers. While touring the
nation to promote ratification of the peace treaty negotiated at
Versailles, Wilson took time to comment on the police strike in a
speech he gave in Helena, Montana. The President insisted, "A
strike of the policemen of a great city,

leaving that city at the

mercy of an army of thugs, is a crime against civilization."
Wilson added that, "the obligation of a policeman is as sacred and
direct as the obligation of a soldier....He has no right to prefer
any private advantage to the public safety."5
Much of the criticism of the police strike reflected the
general fear of radicalism that had gripped the American public
shortly after the conclusion of the First World War. This hysteria
led many Americans to leap to the erroneous conclusion that the
Boston Police Strike was the first step in a nationwide uprising
by radical elements. Allusions to the Bolshevik take-over in
Russia filled the editorials that appeared in response to the
policemen's strike. Two days after the strike began, the Boston
Post commented, "Boston is not Moscow and Massachusetts is not
Russia. No soviet mob rule for us, thank you." The Evening
Transcript declared that the police union's "attempt to overthrow
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American government hereabout is foredoomed to failure," and
referred to the strike as "this skirmish with Bolshevism."
Throughout the nation the response was similar. In its report on
the disorder in Boston, the New Orleans Tlmes-Plcavune wrote, "the
soviet spirit ran amuckf" and compared events in Boston with the
rioting in Petrograd and Moscow. To the editors of the New York
Times, the strike was "this Boston essay in Bolshevism." A police
strike, the paper said, "is an imported, revolutionary idea that
may spread to various cities." The Philadelphia Publlc Ledger
declared, "Bolshevism in the United States is no longer a specter.
Boston in chaos reveals its sinister substance.” The New York
World announced, "The policemen of Boston...boldly undertook to
set up a Soviet government which, if successful, would have been
superior to the commonwealth.” Some federal officials even
succumbed to the hysteria. A few days after the strike began,
Senator Henry L. Myers of Montana contended that the unionization
of policemen would be followed by the unionization of soldiers and
sailors. Myers predicted that, if that were allowed to happen, "We
will have a soviet government within two years....There will be no
need of holding an election in 1920.” The accusation of
Bolshevism, of course, came as a shock to the policemen, whose
actual agenda was far less political and more limited in scope
than that attributed to them. Nevertheless, once the striking
policemen had been labeled radicals, few seemed willing to accept
the less flamboyant interpretation that they were simply typical
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working-class Americans in search of a way to improve their own
working conditions.6
Convinced that such negative publicity would undermine the
prestige of the A.F.L., Samuel Gompers decided to involve himself
in the police controversy in an effort to end the strike as soon
as possible. Hoping to at least preserve the policemen/s Jobs,
Gompers sent identical telegrams, dated September 12, to Governor
Coolidge and to Mayor Peters requesting that they allow the
striking policemen to return to their posts. Gompers made
reference to President Wilson's request that enforcement of the
anti-union regulation enacted by the Metropolitan Police
Department of Washington be delayed until after the Industrial
conference scheduled for October, and he appealed for a similar
deferral

in the case of the Boston patrolmen. Gompers also

informed the officials that he planned to contact Frank McCarthy,
the A.F.L.'s organizer in Boston, with instructions that he
strongly recommend to the members of the Policemen's Union that
they return to work pending settlement of the dispute. That
evening, three days after their walkout began, the Boston
Policemen's Union voted unanimously to follow Gompers's suggestion
and to return to work.7
Public sentiment against the policemen, though, made it
unlikely that any elected official would adopt the course of
action suggested by Gompers, and Coolidge, moreover, was still
committed to allowing the police commissioner a free hand in
handling the crisis. In a telegram dispatched to Gompers on

♦
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September 13, Coolidge declared, “the suggestions contained In
your telegram are not within the Jurisdiction of the Governor of
Massachusetts, but only of the commissioner of police of the city
of Boston. With the maintenance of discipline in his department, I
have no authority to interfere." That same day, Curtis issued
general order No. 124, declaring the positions of all 1,117
striking policemen to be vacant, and he commenced the recruitment
of a new force.8
Upon receiving Coolldge's telegram, Gompers immediately sent
a reply in which he repeated his appeal that the men be
reinstated. This time, his criticism of Curtis was far sharper.
Gompers insisted that the issue at hand was not one of law and
order, but rather, it concerned "the assumption of an autocratic
and unwarranted position by the commissioner of police, who is not
responsible to the people of Boston but is appointed by you.*
Gompers asserted, "the right of the policemen to organize has been
denied— a right which has heretofore never been questioned."9
In his reply to Gompers, Coolidge took the opportunity to
issue his strongest statement up to that point. He reaffirmed his
decision to refrain from interfering with the work of the police
commissioner, pointing out, "I have already refused to remove the
Police Commissioner of Boston. I did not appoint him. He can
assume no position which the Courts would uphold except what the
people have by the authority of their law vested in him. He speaks
only with their voice." President W1Ison's suggestion to the
police officials in Washington, Coolidge observed, had no bearing
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on conditions in Boston because the Washington police had not gone
on strike. In response to the claim by Gompers that the policemen
had a right to unionize, Coolidge replied, "The right of the
police of Boston to affiliate has always been questioned, never
granted, is now prohibited.■ The statement that captured the
attention of the nation, however, was Coolidge/s assertion that
"There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody,
anywhere, any time." In one simple sentence, Coolidge had
summarized the concerns that the entire nation had expressed
regarding the police strike. Public response to the statement was
overwhelming. The staunchly Republican Boston Evening Transcript
called Coolidge's telegram "a state paper certain to enhance the
highest traditions of the great office so worthily filled today."
Coolidge, the paper contended, "speaks the voice of
Massachusetts." Even the Boston Post. one of the city's leading
Democratic papers, said that Coolidge's statement represented
"sound doctrine," and added, "Governor Coolidge has enunciated a
great truth in a terse phrase that will

live." Coolidge's telegram

was reprinted in newspapers throughout the nation. Within a few
weeks the governor received 70,000 letters and telegrams
expressing approval of his stand, and his picture appeared in over
one thousand different publications. In spite of his belated
involvement in the controversy, Coolidge was the one who emerged
from it a national hero. His refusal to force Curtis to reinstate
the striking police earned him a reputation as the man who had
preserved law and order in Boston and, in so doing, had saved the
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entire nation from upheaval. Later, Coolidge was able to parlay
this notoriety into a Republican Party nomination for the
Vice-Presidency. Thus, the police strike played a significant role
in propelling Coolidge to the White House.10
As a final blow to their cause, organized labor itself
retreated from its original stand of unqualified support for the
policemen. Contrary to the Impassioned pledges which they had
offered before the strike,

local labor leaders began to feel that

associating themselves with a movement that had attracted such
ardent public condemnation would not be in their own
organizations' best Interests. Furthermore, Gompers himself worked
to restrain the city's other A.F.L. affiliates. Shortly after the
strike began, he dispatched his personal secretary, Guy Oyster, to
Boston. Oyster met not only with Curtis and Mclnnes, but also with
Michael O'Donnell, the President of the Boston Central Labor
Union. In the meanwhile, an official at the A.F.L.'s headquarters
in Washington Issued a statement which read, "Mr. Gompers does not
want a general strike and the Federation does not want a general
strike."11
After delaying any decision concerning a general strike for
nearly two weeks, the leaders of the Boston Central Labor Union
finally called a meeting at which the local unions' votes on the
issue of a general strike were to be reported. After renewing
pledges of financial and moral support for the striking policemen,
O'Donnell reported that the committee created to coordinate policy
on the strike "finds it advisable not to announce the
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organizations that have voted to participate in a general
movement." 0 /Donne 11 proceeded to declare that, in the opinion of
the committee, "the time is not opportune for ordering a general
strike." The meeting was adjourned without any further action, and
a general strike was never called.12
Realizing that his own involvement in the controversy had
only served to further damage the prestige of organized labor and,
at the same time, had afforded opportunities for Coolidge and
Curtis to enhance their own public stature, the President of the
A.F.L. also began to distance himself from the strike. Less than
two weeks after the Boston Police Strike began, Gompers testified
at hearings before the Senate Committee on the District of
Columbia, which was considering a bill to withhold salaries from
any Washington policemen who belonged to a union. In his
testimony, Gompers upheld the rights of policemen to form unions
and to affiliate with the A.F.L. However, he also publicly
announced that, in his opinion, policemen did not have a right to
strike.13
The striking policemen of Boston were never permitted to
return to their Jobs. In November 1919, Judge Carroll of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of
mandamus which would have required Curtis to reinstate them.
Instead, the police department recruited a brand new force. In
order to recruit enough new policemen, however, Curtis had to ask
the civil service commission to reduce the standards that new
police officers were required to meet. In a further effort to
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attract applicants, the police commissioner also Insisted that the
city improve working conditions. The department began to provide
uniforms for the men, and the starting salary for new recruits was
raised to $1400. This time, Mayor Peters approved the salary
request without complaint. In a memo Issued Just four days after
the strike began, Curtis also ordered Superintendent Michael
Crowley to have the division captains make dally Inspections of
the station houses and, In particular, to "see that everything is
clean and that all vermin be exterminated." Two days later, the
City Council authorized the preparation of plans for a new police
station to replace the rat- and insect-infested station near City
Hall. Ironically, then, the strike did compel officials to remedy
some of the pollcemen/s grievances, even if the men who staged the
walkout were never to enjoy the improved working conditions.14
The number of patrolmen on the force was increased from 1,544
at the time of the strike to 1,614 a year later. The new force was
hastily recruited, however, and as a result many of the new
policemen were not able, or not inclined, to meet the demands that
the department placed upon them. In the first 14 months following
the strike, 253 officers resigned from the force and another 84
were discharged. In fact, the department continued to feel the
repercussions of the strike for the next decade. From 1894 to
1918, an average of eight policemen had been discharged from the
Boston Police Department each year. Between 1921 and 1928, the
average was 25 per year. Not long after the strike, the Boston
Police Department's reputation for excellence was gone.15
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The Boston Police Strike also had a tremendous impact on
police departments throughout the nation. This impact was
two-fold. First of all, like their counterparts in Boston, police
and municipal officials in several cities, including New York and
Washington, responded to the strike by raising salaries and
improving working conditions. On the other hand, the strike also
brought the police union movement to an abrupt halt. Nearly every
police union that had affiliated with the A.F.L. either returned
its charter voluntarily or was forced to do so by local officials.
By the end of 1920, the A.F.L. revoked the outstanding charters,
and the police union movement came to an end.*6
The strike had an adverse impact on the union movement within
the ranks of other public employees as well. In February 1920, the
A.F.L.'s official monthly publication, American Federation 1st,
reported that within the past month alone, 23 firefighters' locals
had disbanded. The strike also contributed to the decline of the
American Federation of

Teachers.

The legacy of the Boston Police Strike plagued attempts to
unionize policemen for decades after the strike. When organized
labor launched a second attempt to recruit police officers to
their ranks In the 1940's, public officials referred repeatedly to
the Boston Police Strike and to the subsequent disturbances in
their efforts to block the union organizers. The same arguments
that had been used in Boston in 1919, arguments about divided
allegiance and the threat that unionization posed to discipline
within the department, resurfaced when the American Federation of
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State, County and Municipal Employees, an affiliate of the A.F.L.,
attempted to organize the policemen In numerous cities. A pamphlet
entitled Pol Ice Unions, published by the International Association
of Police Chiefs in 1944, and then republished in 1958, included a
lengthy account of the Boston Police Strike, focusing much of Its
attention on the vandalism and looting that erupted as a result of
the strike. The pamphlet Included quotes from Wilson and Coolidge
condemning the strike, and went on to say that, through the years,
the strike "has served as a poignant reminder to police of the
nation that divided allegiance can bring nothing but sweeping
public resentment and destructive criticism.- The I.A.C.P.
concluded that "the prevalent majority opinion appears to be that
police unions, aff11lated with trade-labor organizations, are
contrary to the basic nature of police duties." During the 1940/s,
patrolmen in numerous cities, including Los Angeles, Saint Louis,
Detroit, Miami and Chicago, attempted to establish unions, but in
nearly every case the unions were subsequently disbanded under
threats of dismissal. Through a combination of city ordinances,
department regulations and court decisions, the police union
movement was again laid to rest by the end of the 1940's. Thus,
until the 1960's, those police organizations that did exist were
forced to remain strictly local in nature. Police unionism was not
revived again until the 1960's and 1970's, when a new, much more
militant mood hit the nation's police officers. This militancy
resulted in the creation of many of the organizations, some
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independent and some affl1lated with national unions, that
represent policemen today.18
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The police reformers' efforts to significantly alter both
police acknlnlstration and the policeman himself were responsible
for the creation of a police department in Boston in which
corruption was minimal and expectations for performance were high.
Nevertheless,

it also allowed serious problems to arise and to go

unremedled. The reforms created a situation in which municipal
officials and police adninlstrators came to view one another not
as partners but as enemies, and then permitted this animosity to
continue for decades. This persistent hostility impeded the proper
funding of the police force, and it diverted the attention of
officials at exactly those times when a concerted response may
have helped to resolve problems. Reform led to the emergence of a
police commissioner whose power within the department went
virtually unchecked and whose accountability to anyone outside the
department was minimal. This autonomy meant that the department's
ability to serve the interests of the community or to maintain an
acceptable level of morale within its ranks was, to a large
degree, dependent upon the personal characteristics of the
commissioner in charge at the moment. Stephen O'Meara was able to
fulfill the obligations of such a role quite successfully. Edwin
Curtis was not. Thus, reform failed to create a command structure
capable of maintaining a level of effectiveness that was reliably
high and transferable from one achnlnlstration to another. Finally,
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professionalization placed increasing, and often conflicting,
demands on the policeman at the same time that it instilled in him
the notion that police work was a noble, life-long career rather
than just a Job. Together, these factors created a police force
that was keenly aware of the inadequacies of its working
conditions and willing to take action to remedy the situation. The
professional

ideal, however, severely limited the range of action

that the policeman could legitimately take in pursuit of his own
Interests. The reformers'' intent was for professionalization to
produce a highly dedicated and disciplined police force. In
Boston, it created one that was frustrated and willing to rebel
against its commanders.
Thus, a number of forces came together to spark the chain of
events that culminated in the strike by the Boston police. Rivalry
among various government officials, the unrestrained power of the
police commissioner and the growing frustration of the patrolmen,
all of which were interrelated,

laid the groundwork for the crisis

that ensued. The deterioration of the patrolmen's economic
position during and after the First World War and the simultaneous
lure of a successful organized labor movement then provided the
impetus for the action that brought the tension within the
department to a head and brought the problems of the
widely-acclaimed police department to light. Finally, the
long-standing animosity between city and police officials,
compounded by the police commissioner's autonomy, undermined the
efforts to reach a compromise that may have averted the strike in
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much the seme way that the settlement proposed by the mayor of
Cincinnati had ended the strike by that city's policemen one year
earlier.
The goal of police reform had been to create a police force
that would more effectively serve the needs of the community, or,
more accurately, would serve the needs of the community as they
were defined by the reformers. The needs of the policemen who were
expected to provide this service were not attended to, nor did the
reformers feel they warranted consideration. As a result, police
reform often created conditions that were detrimental to the
policeman's interests. The resultant frustration was further
compounded by the stress that was generated when a polIce force
recruited from the working class was expected to display behaviors
and attitudes that differed dramatically from those
characteristically expected from other members of that class.
Originally, the reformers held the view that the policeman was
simply to accept this frustration as the price he paid for the
honor of serving his city. Their devotion to the concept of the
policeman as an obedient, self-sacrificing servant of the
community, however, prevented the reformers from addressing the
fact that a disgruntled police force cannot provide a city with
adequate protection.
In Boston, this frustration erupted into a conflict in which
the public's interests were endangered, thus proving that, at
times, it is in the best interests of the public to attend to the
interests of the public servant. This lesson was not lost on the
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officials throughout the nation who responded to the Boston Police
Strike by improving working conditions within their police
departments. Nor was it lost on at least some of the police
reformers. Writing after the Boston Police Strike, Raymond Fosdick
reiterated the idea that the rights to strike or to affiliate with
labor unions were incompatible with the policeman's duty to serve
the community. He then proceeded to point out, however, that the
community has its own duty to the policeman. Fosdick found the low
pay, long hours, and unsanitary station houses that characterized
many police departments to be inexcusable. He observed:

If the police may not strike to improve their
situation, and if they may not affiliate with
organized labor, then the community that employs
them owes them a responsibility which up to the
present time, certainly, it has not fulfilled. It
cannot strip them of the weapons of defense which
other workers have, and at the same time ignore
their just claims because they are merely pressed
by argument.1

In the midst of the Boston Police Strike, the editors of the
Boston Globe showed that they had come to a similar realization.
In rejecting the policemen's bid to affiliate with the American
Federation of Labor, the Globe argued, "We are only lately emerged
from a long struggle to rescue the police in this country from the
control of political parties and to place them on a footing of
self-respecting independence....The people would not consent to
see them pass into a new partisanship." However, the Globe
continued:
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Since It claims a special duty of [the policeman],
the public owes a special duty to him....When the
old spoils system was in vogue, the spoilsmen in
City Councils and Congress looked out for their
appointees in office, and a generation ago a
Government Job was among the best-paid
employments. This is no longer true, and we are to
blame for this.2

Thus, the police strike seems to have produced at least some
awareness of the fact that, lofty sentiments of the professional
ideal aside, police work must meet not only the community's need
for the maintenance of law and order, but also the policeman's
need to support his family and to derive adequate satisfaction
from his work. The Boston Police Strike proved that a community
must find a way to maintain an acceptable balance between these
two sets of demands if it is to enjoy the benefits of effective
police protection.
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